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GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMY AND 
EFFICIENCY; THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT 
REORGANIZATION ON PUBLIC POLICY
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF 
GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION
Introduction 
The role of government in the United States has 
increased at a dramatic rate in the twentieth century. One 
result of this expansion of government has been a marked 
increase in both the importance and size of the administra­
tive establishment.^ The bureaucracy has been charged with 
the responsibility for the execution of policy and, in many 
instances, with both the formulation and interpretation of 
public policy.
This increased level of activity, size, and cost of 
government has been accompanied, especially in the recent past, 
with a sense of public concern over the activities of the 
government bureaucracy. It has been observed that " . . .  
governmental bureaucracies tend to be all things bad to all
people" (Brown, 1977: 163-70). In an attempt to improve
the public image of government, eliminate waste, and increase 
efficiency, many reformers and elected officials have advo­
cated government reorganization as an appropriate remedy. It 
is the purpose of this research to evaluate the efficacy of 
structural reorganization of government.
A basic belief of advocates of government reorgani­
zation is that structure influences policy and performance 
(Shaffer and Weber, 1974). This conviction that structure is 
related to performance is reflected in the statement by Casper 
Weinberger (1978: 105-09), former Secretary of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare: "Good organization cannot
assure good programmatic results, but bad organization can 
prevent government from acting." According to Mr. Weinberger, 
good organization is achieved through the application of pri- 
vate business organization principles to government structure. 
This link between structure and performance has been accepted 
by President Carter. In the words of Bert Lance, former 
director of the Office of Management and Budget (Fain, 1977: 
ix) :
Over the last several years, national pollsters 
have documented a public conviction that govern­
ment is cumbersome, ineffective, and remote.
Reform and reorganization of the way the federal 
government related to the American people became 
a central part of the President's Carter mandate 
from the electorate.
That proponents of reorganization are motivated by 
a desire to increase the economy and efficiency of government
was observed as early as 1939 (Meriam and Schmeckebeir).
This motivation has been manifested in two basic objectives 
of reformers. The first focused on increasing the economy 
of government through an actual reduction in the level of 
expenditures. The second defined economy as an increase in 
the level of operating efficiency within government. Reorgan­
ization is seen as one technique for controlling the increas­
ing costs of government.
While economy and efficiency have provided motivation 
for reorganization, other forces and concerns have also served 
as a stimulus. These include the basic values of accounta­
bility and responsiveness (Council of State Governments, 1950). 
Deil Wright (1967: 1-26) surveyed 933 department and agency
heads from all fifty states and found that:
The structural insulation of portions of state 
government under boards and commissions has pro­
duced a demonstrably "independent" attitude among 
state administrators. These inclinations toward 
independence pose a major challenge to the firmly 
held tenet of a politically responsive bureaucracy.
Structural insulation is possible due to the pattern 
of growth of the administrative branch of government. As the 
functions of government increased, the legislative branch, at 
both the national and state levels, began to create boards, 
commissions and agencies which were placed in the executive 
branch with minimal concern for an integrated organizational 
structure (Buck, 1950). The result was structural fragmenta­
tion of the executive branch. Reform groups such as the 
Committee for Economic Development (1967: 49) view fragmen­
tation as a threat to effective government:
structural fragmentation amounts to chaos, 
department independence bordering on anarchy, 
and the absence of suitable tools for planning, 
personnel management, financial control and 
renders effective administration almost 
impossible.
Consolidation became the cure for fragmentation. Reorgani­
zation through consolidation became the pathway to "better 
and more economical government" (Buck, 1950: 14). The con­
cern with administrative reform is not unique to either the 
state or national level. The expanding role of government 
at both levels stimulated the search for an improved admin­
istrative establishment (Riggs, 1961).
Reorganization at the 
Federal Level
Reorganization has not been a term with a single, 
universally accepted meaning. It was often simply a "blanket" 
term which was applied to changes that were not strictly 
structural in nature (Meriam and Schmeckebier, 1939). The 
reorganization reform movement developed in the years follow­
ing the Civil War (Pemberton, 1979). During this period, the 
Congress created new executive branch agencies in response to 
the changing conditions as the nation industrialized. The 
result was uncoordinated growth of the federal bureaucracy.
The earliest proposals for reorganization originated 
in the Congress and not from the President. The statement ; 
"Put business into government" often reflected the attitude 
within the Congress (Polenberg, 1960; Pemberton, 1979). Con­
gressional concern with administrative procedures and
organization can be traced as far back as the Fifth Congress
with an investigation of administrative procedures which was
conducted at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Major
efforts by the Congress did not surface until the period 1893-
1895 when the Dockery-Cockrell Commission was created to examine
departmental organization (Emmerich, 1950; Pemberton, 1979).
With the administration of President Theodore
Roosevelt, reorganization efforts shifted from the Congress
to the White House. This can be attributed to the fact that
The practice of management of the executive branch 
by the President started with Washington but a 
general theory of presidential administration 
did not emerge until the Twentieth Century 
(Emmerich, 1971: 29).
In 1905, President Roosevelt appointed Charles H.
Keep, the Assistant Secretary of Treasury, to head the Commit­
tee on Department Methods. Popularly known as the Keep Com­
mission, it reported that reorganization would have to be a 
continuous process if positive results were to be achieved 
(Emmerich, 1971).
President William H. Taft created his own Commission 
on Economy and Efficiency in 1910. The commission included as 
members W. F. Willoughby and Frank J. Goodnow, political 
scientists with expertise in the field of public administration. 
The commission delivered its report to the Congress in 1912 
and also recommended that reorganization be approached as a 
continuing process. While no action was taken by Congress, 
the activities of the commission did stimulate several states 
to create similar commissions to investigate their own
administrative organization (Buck, 1950; Riggs, 1961;
Pemberton, 1979).
With entry of the United States into World War I, 
the need for flexibility in management by the President became 
essential to the war effort. The result was the passage on 
May 20, 1918 of the Overman Act, which granted the President 
limited reorganization powers during times of war. President 
Wilson utilized these new powers to consolidate government 
programs and to create new agencies to manage the war effort 
(Emmerich, 1971; Pemberton, 1979).
Concern with reorganization continued during the years 
following the First World War. In 1923, Congress created the 
Joint Committee on Reorganization of Government Departments.
In this cooperative effort between the Congress and the White 
House, President Warren Harding appointed the committee chair­
man. The committee focused on consolidation and the applica­
tion of principles of administration. A primary concern was 
one of reducing the number of individuals reporting directly 
to the President. The committee accepted the principles of 
hierarchical organization (Fain, 1977; Emmerich, 1950).
Congress did give President Hoover the authority to reorganize 
the executive branch in 1932. Congress also refused to approve 
any of the plans for reorganization submitted by President 
Hoover (Pemberton, 1979).
The movement for reorganization gained momentum 
during the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. In 1937, the
President's Committee on Administrative Management, under the 
chairmanship of Louis Brownlow, was established. The Brown- 
low Commission produced reorganization efforts by the Presi­
dent and stimulated reorganization at the state level.
President Roosevelt was unsuccessful in gaining congressional 
approval of his plan for reorganization in 1937.  ̂ This failure 
was due, in part, to his proposal to expand the membership of 
the United States Supreme Court as part of his reorganization 
efforts (Pemberton, 1979). In 1939, President Roosevelt was 
successful in gaining approval of a new reorganization plan, 
which created the Executive Office of the President. This 
new office was a direct outgrowth of the report by the Brown- 
low Commission and embraced the concept of increased presiden­
tial management authority.
Roosevelt moved to restructure government under the 
authority granted by the Reorganization Act of 1939, which 
empowered the President to "reduce, co-ordinate, consolidate 
and reorganize" the executive branch of government (Henderson, 
1975: 105). Congress approved all five of the reorganization
plans submitted by President Roosevelt during 1939-1940.
With the entry of the United States into World War Two, the 
President was again impowered to reorganize the executive 
branch with the passage of the War Powers Act in 1941 (Johnson, 
1953). President Roosevelt's power to reorganize government 
had increased as a result of the economic problems of the 
Great Depression and of the outbreak of the Second World War.
The Hoover Commission
In 1947 the Republican Party anticipated victory 
in the 1948 general elections. With the prospect of Republi­
can control of both the White House and Congress, Representative 
Clarence Brown (R-Ohio) and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass.) 
introduced identical bills in January, 1947 designed to create 
a commission to study the administrative structure of govern­
ment (Emmerich, 1971; Pemberton, 1979). It was hoped that the 
commission report would support the anticipated dismantling 
of various "New Deal" programs and agencies.
The First Hoover Commission was created in 1947 and 
issued its report in 1949 (Hoover, 1 9 4 9 ) The Commission was 
assigned the task of integrating the federal structure which 
had expanded under Franklin Roosevelt. It was also expected 
that the Commission would provide a basis for defining and 
limiting the executive branch (Emmerich, 1950). A basic con­
cern of the Commission involved the centralization of policy 
making responsibility. The Commission examined approaches 
which would increase the managerial powers of agency heads.
At the same time it also demonstrated a "strong attachment to 
the principles of decentralization of operations with standards 
and supervision centrally supplied" (Emmerich, 1950; 107).
The final report did call for the reorganization 
of the executive branch of government. Among the recommenda­
tions were :
1. The creation of an orderly grouping of govern­
ment functions into major departments under the 
President.
2. Establishment of clear lines of control from
the President to the departments.
3. Permit departments and agencies the freedom to 
administer routine affairs while retaining 
supervision to insure conformity with standards. 
(Hoover, 1949; 7).
Even though the Hoover Commission was inspired by the Congress,
its report advocated increased power for the chief executive
(Johnson, 1953; Fain, 1977).
The Second Hoover Commission was created in 1953 and
issued its report in 1955. It focused on what government
should do, not on the structural organization of the executive 
branch (Emmerich, 1971). The Second Commission addressed the 
issues involved with the auditing of operating methods. It 
did not produce guidelines for the restructuring of government 
(Fain, 1977).
Recent Presidential Activity
Presidential interest in reorganization has remained 
relatively high since the formation of the Hoover Commission. 
Congress has been willing to grant reorganization authority 
to the White House with minimal reservations. The Reorganiza­
tion Act of 1945 was passed under the Truman Administration.
The President’s power to initiate change was again granted 
with the passage of the 1949 reorganization act which was ex­
tended in 1957 and expired finally in 1959. Congress granted 
reorganization power to President Kennedy (1961-1963) and to 
Presidents Johnson and Nixon (1964-1973). Congress allowed 
the reorganization authority of the President to lapse in 1973
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and did not restore it until 1977 under President Carter 
(Henderson, 1975; Nigro, 1980).
President Kennedy demonstrated his interest in 
reorganization with the creation of a Reorganization Study 
Group headed by Don Price which issued its report in 1964 
after the President's assassination. The Group did recommend
5the creation of five new departments, but no action was taken 
(Fain, 1972).
Reorganization efforts continued under President 
Lyndon Johnson with the creation of the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development in 1965 and the Department of Transpor­
tation in 1966. The President created another task force 
charged with examining potential organizational changes.
Their report was issued in 1967 and proposed consolidation 
of the Commerce and Labor Departments into a single Department 
of Business and Labor (.Miles, 1977; Fain, 1977). After Presi­
dent Johnson failed to obtain congressional approval for the 
merger in 1967, his administration made no further attempts at 
consolidations
President Richard Nixon also manifested an interest 
in government reorganization. The President's Advisory Council 
on Executive Organization was created in April of 1969 and 
chaired by Roy L. Ash of Litton Industries (Fain, 1977). The 
intensity of President Nixon's belief in reorganization is 
reflected in his 1971 State of the Union Address. One of the 
six goals announced involved a complete reform of the federal 
government itself.^ In the words of the President;
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Based on a long intensive study with the aid of 
the best advice obtainable, I have concluded that 
a sweeping reorganization of the Executive Branch 
is needed if government is to keep up with the 
times and with the needs of the people. (House 
Document 92-L, January 22, 1977)
The proposed reorganization, based on the findings 
of the Ash Council, would have kept four departments: State,
Treasury, Defense, and Justice. Seven would have been
nabolished: Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, Transportation,
Labor, Health, Education and Welfare, and Housing and Urban 
Development. Their functions would have been assumed by four 
new departments: Human Resources, Community Development,
Natural Resources, and Economic Affairs (Pain, 1977). These 
proposals involved major organizational changes and were con­
sistent with the President's conviction that only comprehensive 
reform would restore the public's confidence in government.
These proposals involved reorganization along func­
tional lines with consolidation as the primary tool. This 
commitment to consolidation is reflected in the President's 
statement:
Nine different Federal departments and twenty 
independent agencies are involved in education 
matters. Seven departments and eight independent 
agencies in health. . . . While we cannot eliminate 
all of this diffusion we can do a great deal to 
bring similar functions under common commands.
(House Document No. 92-75, March 25, 1971)
The reorganization of government by consolidation along func­
tional lines was designed to deliver benefits such as: the
restoration of public confidence in government, an increase 
in the responsiveness of government, the ability to transcend
12
special interest groups, and monetary savings. Roy Ash 
commented at the National Press Club on February 10, 1971 
that reorganization would result in an estimated $5 billion 
annual savings due to an increase in the level of management 
efficiency (Fain, 1977; 20).
Congress held hearings on the proposed reorganiza­
tion plan. No legislation was passed allowing the President
to implement his plans. The President did not submit new pro-
0posais after Congress refused to act on his initial package. 
As the Watergate affair unfolded. Congress became concerned 
with the potential for presidential abuse of power. As a 
result. Congress allowed the reorganization powers of the 
President to expire on April 1, 1973.
Reorganization under 
President Carter
Jimmy Carter announced his plans to reorganize the
executive branch of government during the 1976 presidential
campaign. His acceptance speech at the Democratic national
convention in July, 1976 reflected this concern with changing
the structure of the federal government.
As governor [of Georgia], I had to deal each day 
with the complicated and confused and overlapping 
and wasteful federal government bureaucracy. As 
President, I want you to help me evolve an 
efficient, economical, purposeful and manageable 
government for our nation. Now I recognize the 
difficulty, but if I'm elected, it's going to be 
done, and you can depend on it. (Congressional 
Quarterly, 1977: 39)
During the campaign Governor Carter avoided specific details
when questioned about his reorganization plans but did state
13
that the approximately 1,900 federal departments and agencies 
could be reduced to 200. After his election, the President 
affirmed his intention "to improve the efficiency and effec­
tiveness" of the federal bureaucracy through organization 
streamlining (Presidential Documents, 1977: 493-94). On
March 31, 1977, Congress gave President Carter the authority 
to begin reorganization of the bureaucracy.
The President decided to move slowly and deliberately 
in his move to initiate change. The decision was made to 
create the President's Reorganization Project (PRP) within 
the Office of Management and Budget, with both political 
appointees and career civil servants assigned to the project. 
Prospective reorganization efforts were divided into five 
functional areas: defense and international affairs, human
resources, economic and community development, natural resources, 
and general government (Dempsey, 1979). Such careful planning 
and analysis is, in the words of former Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, an indication that "the Carter Admin­
istration's emphasis on reorganization is not simply manager­
ial fascination with box shifting and linedrawing on an organi­
zational chart" (Fain, 1977: ix).
Three major elements comprise President Carter's 
approach to reorganization. These are: agency reorganization,
civil service reform, and the adoption of zero-based budgeting 
CWatson, 1978). Zero-based budgeting was adopted as a manage­
ment tool for the identification of programs and agencies that
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are appropriate candidates for either consolidation or 
elimination. ZBB and reorganization are the key instruments 
for improving the quality of government. Civil service reform 
is intended to allow the President increased flexibility in 
the management of government (Campbell, 1978).
The first five reorganization plans submitted by 
President Carter were approved by Congress, yet very little 
substantive reorganization has taken place. The five plans 
have reorganized the Executive Office of the President, com­
bined the Information Agency with State Department's Bureau 
of Education and Cultural Affairs, consolidated "equal 
employment" activities in the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, created the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
and reformed the civil service system (Dempsey, 1979). The 
major accomplishments of the Carter Administration have been 
in the creation of the Department of Energy, the Department 
of Education, and the enactment of the 1978 Civil Service 
Reform Act.
Concern with creating a single department with 
responsibility for managing the nation's energy requirements 
can be traced to the Nixon Administration. While consolida­
tion was not achieved by President Nixon, Congress did create 
new agencies to deal with the energy problem. The Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) was split into two new agencies: the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research 
and Development Administration (ERDA). The energy bureaucracy 
was proliferating without a mechanism for coordination.
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President Carter presented a plan for reorganizing 
the federal energy bureaucracy on March 1, 1977. In his 
words; "Nowhere is the need greater for reorganizing and 
consolidation than in energy policy." (Congressional 
Quarterly, 1977: 22) The President's choices could be cate­
gorized into three basic options (Fain, 1977: 633). The
first option favored high decentralization with an orientation 
to the status quo. Such an option would have extended the 
power of the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) but would 
have maintained the fragmented structure of numerous inde­
pendent agencies. The second option favored moderate central­
ization with the creation of an expanded national energy 
organization. The expanded agency would serve as a coordinator 
for the various independent agencies but would wield very little 
power. The third option favored major consolidation through 
the creation of a new Department of Energy. The secretary of 
the new department would exercise control over the agencies 
incorporated into the organization. President Carter selected 
the third option of establishing a centralized energy depart­
ment.
The proposed cabinet level Department of Energy 
passed Congress and was signed into law on August 4, 1977 
tPL 95-91). Figure 1-1 indicates the energy related agencies 
and functions that were consoliated into the new’department. 
Fragmentation of responsibility for energy programs was 
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responsibility were assigned to the new department. These 
included: fuel supply and leasing procedures, research and
development, environment, international energy policy, 
national security, intergovernmental relations, competition 
and consumer affairs, nuclear waste management, energy con­
servation, and power marketing (Thompson, 1979: 45). The
new energy department was a product.of the acceptance of 
functional consolidation as a technique for achieving increased 
levels of effectiveness.
A second major structural change achieved by Presi­
dent Carter involved the enactment of the Civil Service Reform 
Act of 1978. This act, which took effect on January 1, 1979, 
extensively reorganized the personnel function of the federal 
government. Under the provisions of this reform, the Civil 
Service Commission was abolished and its responsibilities 
divided between the Office of Personnel Management (0PM) and 
the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB). The act also 
created the Federal Labor Relations Authority (JLRA) with 
responsibility for monitoring labor-management policies within 
the federal government CLee, 1979: 27-41). Figure 1-2 pro­
vides a graphic display of the change that resulted from the 
reform.
Prior to 1979, presidential control of the personnel 
function was indirect which hindered accountability and 
limited effective policy coordination (Newland, 1976). Under 
the new personnel system, presidential control was increased
18
Figure 1-2
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with the establishment of 0PM as a management agency serving 
the President. The reform produced change extending beyond 
simple box manipulation on an organizational chart. The 
President acquired power to directly control personnel policy.
The third major structural reorganization of the 
Carter Administration involved creation of the Department of 
Education. Congress approved the necessary legislation on 
September 27, 1979. The original proposal would have con­
solidated a number of programs from various departments and 
agencies. The approved department consisted primarily of 
programs formerly housed in the Education Division of the 
department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Congressional 
Quarterly, 1979: 465).
Approximately 152 education related programs were 
consolidated under a single department. The only transfer 
of a major departmental program involved the reolocation of 
responsibility for overseas schools for military dependents 
from the Defense Department to the new Education Department. 
Congress placed limits on the number of employees for the new 
department in an attempt to prevent excessive growth. The 
Office of Management and Budget predicted that the consolida­
tion of programs would result in a reduction of between 350 
and 450 employees (Congressional Quarterly, 1979: 468). It
is too early to evaluate the effects of this reorganization. 
The first Secretary of Education took the oath of office on 
December 6, 1979 with the new department scheduled to become 
operational in June, 1980.
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This commitment to reorganization extended beyond 
the presidential level. Former Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare Joseph A. Califano, Jr. embarked upon an exten­
sive reorganization within HEW in 1977. Califano stated that 
the functional consolidation should produce an annual savings 
of $2 billion by 1981 (Congressional Quarterly, 1977: 446).
Secretary Califano created three new agencies: Health Care
and Financing Administration, Office of Human Development, 
and the Bureau of Student Financial Assistance. Program con­
solidation served to prevent an increase in the number of 
agencies and the number of employees. It would be difficult 
to evaluate the impact of this reorganization due to the 1980 
division of HEW into the two new departments of Education, 
and Health and Human Services.
President Carter has also directed 0MB to investi­
gate the possibility of reorganizing the Departments of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Interior into two new 
departments. HUD would be strengthened and renamed the 
Department of Developmental Assistance (DDA). Interior would 
become the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). The pro­
posals have encountered strong opposition, but 0MB has esti­
mated that the two new departments would save over $600 million 
annually through the elimination of administrative duplication 
and overlap (Congressional Quarterly, 1979; 34). These
structural reforms reflect a deep commitment to functional 
consolidation as the most appropriate technique for organizing 
government.
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The relatively slow pace of the Carter administration 
is consistent with its principles of reorganization as 
specified by Bert Lance (Fain, 1977: x-xii). The guiding
principle involves taking a step-by-step to reorganization. 
Change is established in increments spread over four years 
(eight if the President serves a second term) which follow a 
comprehensive plan. This commitment to incrementalism is 
the result of the belief that single, sweeping reorganiza­
tion plans are not effective in the American political sys­
tem due to the necessity for compromise in the Congress.
Closely related to the step-by-step approach is the
principle of priority planning. Reorganization efforts are
directed toward carefully selected targets on a priority 
9basis.
Summary of Presidential 
Reorganization
Reorganization at the federal level has been essen­
tially a continuing process. Internal and external pressures 
have fostered presidential leadership in restructuring govern­
ment as changes occurred in the political, cultural, economic, 
and legal environment (Emmerich, 1950). Table 1-1 below 
presents the record of recent presidents and their attempts 
to implement reorganization plans. Reorganization efforts 
have ranged from small, minor consolidations to proposals for 
sweeping, major changes in the bureaucracy. Changes in the 
size, nature, or distribution of the functions of the
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executive branch have stimulated reorganization efforts 
(Arnold, 1974).
Table 1-1
Approval of Presidential 
Reorganization Plans







*President Ford is not included due to the lapse 
of presidential reorganization authority in 1973.
SOURCE; Henderson (1975) and Mansfield (1969)
Four methods exist for reorganization of the federal 
government. The first is statutory, in which Congress enacts 
legislation to either create or abolish an agency or department. 
The second method involves presidential directives. Limited 
reorganization can be achieved with the issuance of an execu­
tive order by the President. The third method for reorganiza­
tion involves the submission of reorganization plans by the 
President to Congress. Under the provisions of the various 
reorganization acts the plan would take effect unless either
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the House or Senate voted against the plan within sixty days 
of submission. This is an all or nothing approach. The 
fourth method involves the internal reorganization of depart­
ments under the direction of the department head. This 
approach allows the transfer and consolidation of programs 
and agencies in a limited fashion (Fain, 1977 and Arnold,
1974). All four methods have been employed in an attempt to 
streamline the federal bureaucracy.
Reorganization of State Government
State government evolved with a fragmented structure 
and weak management powers vested in the hands of the governor 
(National Municipal League, 1940). During the Colonial period, 
the governor, as the representative of the Crown, attempted 
to dominate government. After the Revolutionary War, state 
legislatures were granted preeminence in state constitutions 
due to the concern with potential abuse of power by the chief 
executive (Waldo, 1948). Governors were limited to short 
terms, denied responsibility for preparation of the budget, 
and given relatively few management powers.
Independent boards and commissions were created as 
the functions of government increased. These independent 
agencies were given considerable freedom of action and exper­
ienced few restrictions from the governor. These commissions 
were intended to minimize the effects of partisan politics in 
regulatory policy. Their numbers proliferated and continued 
the fragmentation of state government.
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The process continued to the point that by the 
First World War state governments were so fragmented that 
neither the governor nor the legislature could provide effec­
tive leadership (National Municipal League, 1940). There 
existed little unity in state government, and mechanisms did 
not exist to provide for effective management. The result was 
the growth of a reform movement which turned to an orderly and 
rational governmental structure as the best solution to the 
problem of managing state government.
The early proponents of reorganization believed that 
principles of administration existed and that the problems 
experienced by the states could be overcome through the appli­
cation of these principles to their organizational structure 
(Council of State Governments, 1950). This approach to organ­
ization linked Taylor (1911) and the scientific management 
school to organization structure.
The quest for the "one best way" to organize govern­
ment continued with Gulick and Urwick (.1937) and Fayol (1940). 
Administration was separated from politics, and efficiency 
became the major objective.
The application of classic organization theory as 
embraced by proponents of reorganization included principles 
which were simple and easy to accept. These included:
Unity of command— all elements of the organization 
report to only one supervisor. This procedure 
serves to eliminate the issuance of conflicting 
directives and will serve to maximize implementa­tion.10
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Functional consolidation— greater coordination 
of activities can be achieved if functional 
groupings are created. It would then be possible 
to identify waste, eliminate duplication, and 
achieve a reduction in the number of individuals 
employed.11
Limited span of control— the chief executive 
benefits from a reduced volume of communication, 
can effectively supervise subordinates, and devote 
more time to management and policy-making decisions.
Scalar chain of command— with one chain of command 
under the authority of the chief executive, prior­
ities can be established, agency unity can be main­
tained, and efficiency will be improved (Meier,
1979; 5-6).
The utilization of these principles in a reorganization program 
could improve efficiency and correct the problems encountered 
in state government. Agency proliferation, functional frag­
mentation, and the diffusion of responsibility can be elimi­
nated through a program of structural reorganization (Governor's 
Executive Reorganization Committee, 1969).
Faith in reorganization is reflected in the following 
statement by the Kansas Commission on Executive Reorganization 
(1971: 2):
The executive branch of the Kansas government is 
an organizational jungle. Nearly 200 executive 
branch agencies, most of them operating inde­
pendently could be consolidated into eight major 
departments where they would be subject to effec­
tive management dedicated to producing quality 
results at the least cost.
The utilization of the organizational principles in a major
reorganization would have the effect of improving efficiency
and economy for the state of Kansas. Despite a lack of
solid empirical evidence to support such statements, the
states continue to engage in reorganization activity.
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State Reorganization Activity 
State administrative reorganization was a response 
to the growth patterns of the executive branch of government 
at the state level. During the 1800s the structure of state 
government was characterized by a bias against strong gover­
nors with restrictions imposed on term of office and limita­
tions on managerial power. The Jacksonian era witnessed the 
establishment of a "plural executive" branch as state admin­
istrative positions (.Treasurer, Secretary of State, and others) 
became elective (.Report, 1967). Given the supremacy of the 
legislature and the fragmented nature of the executive branch, 
a conviction emerged in the minds of reformers that no one was 
in charge of state government.
The state reorganization movement can be traced to 
the beginning of the twentieth century as reform movements 
were developing at all levels of government; national, state, 
and local. Various factors contributed to the interest in 
reform. These included the inefficiency and corruption in 
some state governments, the general lack of accountability 
in government, the emergence of private groups interested in 
improving government (e.g., the National Municipal League), 
and the increase in an academic concern with developing a 
"science" of public administration (Caiden, 1969; Buck, 1950).
The first attempt to reorganize was that of the 
Peoples Power League of Oregon in 1909 and 1911 (Riggs, 1961). 
The reforms would have concentrated executive power in the 
hands of the governor and created a unicameral legislature.
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The League was unsuccessful but efforts continued in other 
states. An attempt to reorganize New York failed in 
November, 1915, when the revised State Constitution was 
defeated at the polls (Buck, 1950).
Illinois became the first state to adopt a compre­
hensive plan for administrative reorganization under Governor 
Frank Lowden in 1917 (Buck, 1950). The reorganization was 
effected through statutory actions by the legislature. With 
the exception of the duties of six constitutionally elected 
officials, administrative activity was grouped into ten major 
departments under the control of the governor (Riggs, 1961). 
Following the lead of Illinois, twelve more states reorgan­





1919 Indiana, Nebraska, Massachusetts
1921 California, Michigan, Ohio, Washington
1922 Maryland
1923 Pennsylvania, Vermont, Tennessee
1925 New York
SOURCE; Council of State Governments, 1972
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In 1921 the National Municipal League published 
a Model State Constitution which incorporated the principles 
of a reorganized state executive. The League was convinced 
that extensive reorganization would be possible only with 
constitutional revision in most states. The model constitu­
tion provided for a unicameral legislature, four year term 
for the governor, gubernatorial responsibility for the budget, 
a short ballot with few elected state officials, and embraced 
the value of centralization of authority (Buck, 1950).
Interest in reorganization continued after the 
report by the Brownlow Commission in 1937. The role of the 
governor began to change from that of a figurehead to that of 
a leader (Lipson, 1956) which stimulated concern with govern­
ment management. Following the report of the two Hoover 
Commissions in 1949 and 1955, state interest in reorganiza­
tion was again stimulated. Over thirty states established 
"Little Hoover Commissions," but not a single comprehensive 
reorganization resulted (Council of State Governments, 1972).
This continuing interest in structural reform 
produced three basic waves of state executive reorganization. 
The first developed in the wake of the municipal reform 
movement (1911-1936); the second was motivated by the Brownlow 
Commission of Franklin Roosevelt (1937-1946); and the third 
is a recent development (1965-1975). During the last fifteen 
years, nineteen states have implemented reorganization plans 
(Garnett and Levine, 1978).
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This most recent flurry of activity can be traced
to the conviction in many quarters that:
By and large the structure of state executive 
departments is better suited to the conditions
of a century ago than to the multi-service state
of today. (Report to the National Governor's
Conference, 1967)
Reorganization activity since 1965 has been far greater than
for any other comparable period (Council of State Governments,
1972). Table 1-3 indicates the states which have undergone
significant reorganization in the recent past.
Table 1-3 
State Reorganizations: 1965-1979





Georgia North Carolina Missouri*
Kentucky
*Most recent reorganizations 
SOURCE: Bell, 1979
Recent reorganization efforts have focused on 
limiting the number of departments within the executive branch. 
Few of the reorganized states have as many as twenty depart­
ments. The trend has emerged that the later the reorganiza­
tion, the fewer the number of executive branch departments 
(Council of State Governments, 1972). Missouri has a consti­
tutional limitation of thirteen executive branch departments
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(Bell, 1979). The reorganization movement has resulted in
eleven states adopting constitutional limitation on the
12number of departments.
The success in achieving approval of reorganization 
plans has been attributed to five basic factors (Council of 
State Governments, 1972). First, the "movers and shakers" 
within government have learned by experience. Past attempts 
to reorganize have provided valuable lessons to current reorgan­
ization advocates. Second, attitudes have changed within state 
legislatures. The reapportionment movement has brought in a 
new breed of legislator, one that is concerned with effective 
administration. Third, governors have manifested an increased 
willingness to tackle "hot" issues and push for reform. Fourth, 
federal officials need a strong state administrative establish­
ment to implement programs. The HUD 701 program has provided 
planning grants to states to conduct studies which can be used 
as a basis for reorganization. And fifth, success is infectious. 
As one state implements a reorganization, proponents in other 
states are encouraged to continue their efforts.
The experience of Jimmy Carter in Georgia can provide 
insight into state reorganization activities. After his elec­
tion as governor in 1971, Carter affirmed that reorganization 
of the state bureaucracy would be his first legislative 
priority. Governor Carter observed that;
Every time I open the closet door in my office,
I fear that a new agency will fall out. (Nigro 
and Nigro, 1980: 191)
31
Governor Carter sought authority to reorganize 
similar to that granted the presidents by Congress, in which 
a reorganization plan would automatically take effect if 
neither house of the legislature disapproved. This authority 
was granted in 1971. He then moved to consolidate over 300 
agencies, departments, boards, and commissions into an inte­
grated executive establishment. The reorganization plan 
reduced the number of state budgeted agencies from 65 to 18 
departments and assigned the over 200 remaining nonbudgeted 
boards, commissions, and bureaus into one of the 18 functional 
departments (Fain, 1977; Nigro and Nigro, 1980).
Documented benefits from this reorganization are not 
readily available. The governor was limited to a single four- 
year term. His successors have shown varying levels of commit­
ment to reorganization. The lesson seems to be that while 
reorganization can be implemented with an aggressive approach, 
long term effects depend on an equally strong commitment by 
the successors of those implementing the reorganization.
Principles of Reorganization
Reorganization of state government has been advocated 
as a viable technique for imposing order and control within 
the executive branch of government (Committee for Economic 
Development, 1967). While various groups and organizations 
have supported reorganization in the twentieth century, there 
remains a definite common set of assumptions on which these 
divergent groups agree. One common element involves the
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departure from the fear of a strong chief executive and a 
willingness to concentrate power in the hands of the governor 
(Buck, 1950).
The Report to the National Governors Conference 
(.1967: 25-26) identified basic reorganization guidelines
which have been almost universally accepted. The first calls 
for limiting the elected officials in the executive branch 
to two offices: those of' governor and lieutenant governor. 
Further, these positions should be elected jointly to insure 
that both officials are of the same political party and will 
cooperate as their duties are discharged. Second, four year 
terms should become standard with no limit on the number of 
terms a governor can serve. Also included was the creation 
of an office staff of sufficient size to provide needed mana­
gerial assistance to the governor. The consolidation of 
agencies into a maximum of twenty departments organized along 
functional lines was recommended. And finally, the governor 
should be granted the authority to continuously reorganize the 
executive branch with the legislative retaining veto power 
over any such proposal (also see Citizens Research Council 
of Michigan, 1952).
Each of the principles are consistent with the 
policy of increasing the managerial powers of the governor.
In fact, increasing the powers of the governor is so important 
that "The whole practice of administrative reorganization turns 
on this point." (Buck, 1950: 15) Some reorganization plans
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have incorporated the creation of a governor's cabinet with 
power distributed along parliamentary lines (Minnesota Insti­
tute of Governmental Research, 1962). The cabinet would meet 
and confer on a regular basis to coordinate policy.
Buck (1950) identified four basic types of admin­
istrative reorganization. These are the integrated type, 
the partially-integrated type, the fiscal-control type, and 
the plural-executive type. Under the integrated type, com­
plete executive control is exercised by the governor. He 
appoints department heads and is the only major elected state 
executive officer. Control of the executive branch depends on 
the process of legislative audit and review. With the partially- 
integrated type, some elective state administrative offices 
are retained and only a portion of administrative functions 
are centralized under the governor. With the fiscal-control 
type, management authority is given to the governor through 
financial supervision and not by administrative integration.
The governor would control the bureaucracy through budgetary 
and accounting control. The plural executive is characterized 
by the utilization of several elected state administrative 
officers. The governor shares power with these officers and 
government operations are similar to those in cities operating 
with a commission type of structure. Most reorganization 
efforts are oriented toward the integrated type. This is due 
to the concern with increasing the operating efficiency of 
government.
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Reorganization is seen as a means for increased 
administrative efficiency (Rourke, 1976). Bureaus and agencies 
are criticized as displaying an independent attitude in which 
they ignore, subvert, and oppose directives from the chief 
executive (Seidman, 1975). Compliance and efficiency are the 
objectives of reorganization proponents (Fain, 1977).
It is important to note that the organizational 
structure of government reflects the changing priorities of 
society (Miles, 1977). Organization and reorganization do 
not occur in a political vacuum (Seidman, 1975). Effective 
reorganization efforts are coupled with the understanding of 
the political forces which produced the existing structural 
arrangements.
Brown (1977: 163-70) identified several "key"
caveats for effective organizational reform. A major caveat 
involved the separation of program criticisms from those 
directed at the administrative structure. Often, the target 
of criticism is the administrative structure when the true 
complaint stems from the program. Reorganization should be 
pursued only after the problems have been clearly identified. 
Brown, recognizing the social value of existing structures, 
warned against over enthusiastic elimination of a bureaucratic 
system before an adequate replacement could be found.
Bert Lance, a former key advisor to President Carter, 
identified several reasons for the failure to successfully 
implement reorganization plans in the past (Fain, 1977: x).
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First, reorganization plans were sometimes developed in 
secret, in a political vacuum. Consultation with the legis­
lative branch of government was conducted only superficially 
or after the fact. Second, "Reorganization efforts were often 
conducted by study commissions without an institutional base 
of their own." Successful implementation requires some type 
of formal relationship between the formulators of reorganiza­
tion policy and those who must implement that policy. Mr.
Lance also affirmed the necessity for continuous reorganiza­
tion to allow "adaptive modifications" to changing social and 
political conditions.
Reorganization can also be achieved through the use 
of "Sunset Laws" (Fain, 1977). This concept originated in 
Colorado when, in 1975, the state adopted legislation which 
provided for the termination of the state's forty regulatory 
agencies unless the legislature voted to continue their exis­
tence after seven years. Sunset legislation has also been 
applied to government programs in an attempt to limit the 
expansion of agency activity.
While there are various approaches to reorganization, 
there is no guarantee that structural change will automatically 
improve the operation of government. Emmerich (1950, 1971) 
identified three tests which could be employed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of reorganization strategy. These are;
1. Is Administration made constantly more 
responsive to the public interest?
2. Is the ability of the chief executive to 
make far seeing recommendations strengthened?
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3. Is the ability of the chief executive to see 
that the laws are faithfully executed 
enhanced?
Note that economy is not listed as a valid test of 
reorganization.
Reorganization has been opposed on different grounds 
by various groups and individuals (Riggs, 1961; 8). Interest
groups can interpret reorganization plans as a threat to their 
special treatment by a state agency. Another source of opposi­
tion is the fear of concentrating excessive power in the hands 
of the governor. Closely related to this concern is the con­
viction that a number of executive branch positions should be 
elective in order to keep a watchful eye on the activities of 
government agencies (Council of State Governments, 1972;
Rourke, 1976).
The executive branch of government is a reflection 
of thé pluralistic nature of the political system in which 
competing factions leave their mark on the organizational 
structure (Fox, 1974). To insure access and representative­
ness, it has been argued that duplication, overlap, and frag­
mentation are positive values which should not be eliminated 
(Ostrum, 1961).
Critics also note that it is difficult to demonstrate 
actual financial savings after reorganization is implemented.
In a response to a querry from the state of Kansas concerning 
improved economy of operation produced by reorganization, 
Wisconsin officials responded that it was "difficult to docu­
ment any budgetary savings" (Kansas, 1971).
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That structure is not necessarily related to 
policy is reflected by events surrounding the Bureau of Indean 
Affairs. Native Americans have been dissatisfied with the 
bureau and, in some instances, have chosen to use force to 
demonstrate their hostility to the bureau. The Nixon admin­
istration had involved the BIA in a limited reorganization.
The fact that the relationship between the Bureau and the 
clientele it was created to serve did not change is evidence 
that administrative reorganization will not necessarily pro­
duce a change in the policy choices of an organization (Fox, 
1974).
Skepticism concerning reorganization was stated by
a Nixon administration aide:
In truth, the reorganizations that have been 
effective in government have seldom produced 
the lofty results anticipated. Many have fea­
tured form over substance, often degenerating 
into a sterile reshuffling of lines and boxes 
on organizational charts. (Malek, 1978: 214)
Reorganization is turned to as a "miracle drug" to correct
organizational and programmatic deficiencies when alternate
approaches might be more appropriate (Malek, 1978: 236).
In the words of Harold Seidman (1967: 4), "For
the true believer, reorganization can produce miracles. . . . "
Despite the faith held in its curative powers, "Reorganization
is one area where we talk, expend much money and have great
faith> but little knowledge" (Fox, 1974).
It may not even be possible for reorganization to
have any effect on a large bureaucracy if Anthony Downs' are
true:
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The first is the Law of Imperfect Control: No
one can fully control the behavior of large 
organizations. The second is the law of 
Diminishing Control: The larger any organiza­
tion becomes, the weaker is the control over its 
actions exercised by those at the top. The third 
is the Law of Decreasing Coordination: The larger
any organization becomes, the poorer is the 
coordination among its actions (Downs, 1967:
271) .
Public officials and reform oriented organizations 
remain committed to reorganization efforts. It is clear that 
reorganization will remain a viable political issue for the 
foreseeable future.
Conclusion
Reformers continue to call for the reorganization 
of the executive branch at both the national and state govern­
ment level. Yet very little empirical research has been done 
to investigate the consequences of executive reorganization. 
Does it really save money? Are other economies forthcoming, 
as the reformers had hoped? Is there a reduction in govern­
ment employment? The evidence produced so far suggests that 
the expectations of government reformers may be excessively 
optimistic. But further study is certainly needed. This 
research effort employs a time-series analysis to assess the 
effect of executive branch reorganization on selected state 
expenditure policies.
In chapter II, the theoretical framework will be 
presented. The public policy literature contains a wide range 
of studies investigating the relationship between public policy
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and the structure of government. These previous efforts 
have focused on two primary areas: state legislative reform
and governmental reform at the local level. Surprisingly, 
very little research is available which investigates the 
relationship between state executive branch reorganization 
and public policy. The link between this investigation and 
policy studies directed toward legislative and urban reform 
will be established in chapter II.
The methodology to be employed will be discussed in 
detail in chapter III. This research effort will utilize an 
interrupted time-series quasi-experimental design. The 
policy priorities of the governors of twelve of the nineteen 
states which reorganized since 1965 were identified. The 
policy areas so identified were included in the investigation. 
These twelve states were match-paired with twelve nonreorgan­
ized states as a means of increasing experimental control.
The application of interrupted time-series analysis enables 
both the long and short-term effects of reorganization on 
public policy to be evaluated.
Chapter IV contains the results of the time-series 
regression equations. The long and short-term effects of 
reorganization are deemed to exist when changes in the rate 
of increase in per capita expenditures are observed after 
reorganization occurs. By comparing any observed changes in 
a reorganized state with its matched-state, the impact of 
reorganization on policy can be assessed.
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This research effort will provide empirical evidence 
against which the claims and perceived benefits resulting 
from state executive branch reorganization can be evaluated.
If no effect is observed, much of the customary rationale 
supporting reorganization can be questioned.
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Notes
^One indicator of government growth is the increase 
in the number of federal employees from 239,476 in 1901 to 
over 2,724,000 in 1977 (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1980: 39).
2Many of the advocates of the application of private 
sector organization principles to government are guilty of 
oversimplification. There exists a wide range of organiza­
tional systems in the private sector. This includes both 
the highly structured, classic organization of American 
Telephone and Telegraph; and the almost unstructured Texas 
Instruments (Meier, 1979).
^The text by Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing 
Roosevelt’s Government, provides an in-depth review of the 
circumstances surrounding the various attempts at reorganiza­
tion by President Roosevelt.
^The Hoover Commission consisted of twelve members, 
six Republicans and six Democrats. Four were appointed by the 
President, four by the Speaker of the House, and four by the 
Presiding Officer of the Senate. They were drawn from the 
executive branch, the legislative branch, and from the private 
sector.
5The new departments were Transportation, Education, 
Natural Resources, Economic Development, and Housing and 
Community Development.
^The other five goals announced by President Nixon 
were welfare reform, improved health care, a stable economy, 
a better environment, and enactment of a program of revenue 
sharing.
^By November of 1971 President Nixon, in response 
to pressure from farm organizations, had decided to retain 
the Department of Agriculture.gA detailed description and analysis of President 
Nixon's proposals can be found in The Plot That Failed: Nixon
and the Administrative Presidency by Richard Nathan.
9The Presidential Reorganization Project has been 
charged with developing reorganization plans to maximize the 
efficiency and economy of government operations and to simplify 
government so that it is understandable to the average citizen. 
The elimination of fragmentation through consolidation is a 
primary objective of the PRP.
^^The concept of unity of command does not take 
into account the importance of informal networks within 
organizations. Such informal networks can effectively cir­
cumvent formal lines of authority.
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Gulick (1937) stated; "Work division is the 
foundation of organization; indeed the reason for organiza­
tion. "
12These states are: Michigan, Colorado, Montana,
Alaska, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts (maximum 
of twenty); Florida and North Carolina (maximum of twenty- 
five) ; Missouri(maximum of thirteen).
13Mosher (1967) presents a series of case studies 
as a description of the dynamics of agency reorganization.
CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The concern with reorganizing the administrative 
branch of government is directly linked to the belief that 
organizational structure is related to public policy. 
Accordingly, policy can be changed or improved if the 
bureaucracy is reformed by reorganization. This conviction 
has also served as an impetus for the reform movement at the 
local level and for efforts to reform the legislative struc­
ture at the state level. An examination of these two reform 
traditions will enhance the understanding of the movement to 
reform state government by administrative reorganization.
Urban Reform
As the United States industrialized, a demographic 
change occurred in which the majority of the population was 
centered in urban areas reflecting a shift from the rural and 
agrarian past. Municipal government was faced with the task 
of providing services to residents drawn from different cul­
tures and backgrounds. The time was ripe for corruption and 
graft (Banfield and Wilson, 1963). One product of this
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environment was the political machine which existed to 
mobilize electoral support through the provision of basic 
services to urban residents. The machines were especially 
effective!in mobilizing political support from the ethnic 
immigrant population (Lineberry and Sharkansky, 1971).
The urban reform movement sought to improve the quality of 
urban administration and to eliminate the abuses which stemmed 
from the operation of the political machines.
Reformers were drawn from primarily the Protestant 
and Jewish middle-class. They were not first-generation 
Americans or recent immigrants. They tended to be drawn from 
the highly educated strata of society. Reformers were often 
college graduates or the products of professional schools. 
Occupationally, they were oriented toward rational methods of 
organization and operations. They were not oriented toward 
the informal and traditional methods utilized by the leaders 
of the urban machines (Harrington, 1976; Mumford, 1961).
The reformers were committed to the values of democ­
racy and a strong sense of individual responsibility. Coupled 
with this commitment to the basic values of democracy was the 
elitist position that public officials should be drawn from 
the best educated, and therefore, the best qualified segments 
of urban society (Harrington, 1976). The reformers wanted to 
change the system of urban government to reflect their own 
social and economic values. Accordingly, government should 
provide only basic services which individuals could not provide
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for themselves. Further, government should be operated in a 
businesslike manner with a genuine concern for efficiency 
(Morgan and Pelissero, 1978).
The orientation of the poor urban resident was 
markedly different from that of the reformer. Politics was 
often perceived of in very personal terms. Electoral support 
was granted to politicians in exchange for specific benefits. 
These benefits included items ranging from jobs to food and 
fuel. An individual could improve his lot in life by shrewdly 
taking advantage of the operation of the government and the 
political system. Politics was viewed in impersonal terms by 
the reformers. Instead of an arena for obtaining personal 
gain, the reformers viewed politics as "the arena for the 
realization of moral principles of broad application— and even 
in the case of temperance and vice crusades— for the correction 
of private habits" (Hofstadter, 1935: 181). This differing
value system between reformers and the urban poor has led to 
the development of what has been termed the "ethos theory" 
of urban policy (Harrington, 1976).
Ethos Theory
Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson C1963; 38-43)
hypothesized the existence of two conflicting views of govern­
ment based on ethnic and religious cleavages (also see Wilson 
and Banfield, 1964 and 1971). These cleavages are manifested 
in private-regarding and public-regarding ethos. The public- 
regarding ethos reflected the political values of upper- 
middle-class Anglo-Saxon Protestants and Jews. The political
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preferences of these groups centered around a concern for the 
city or community as a whole rather than a concern governed 
by self-interest. The private-regarding ethos was shared by 
lower-class ethnic groups and immigrants. These groups tended 
to focus primarily on issues and policies affecting only their 
immediate neighborhood or group. Policies requiring expendi­
tures for the city as a whole found very little support from 
these groups.
One implication of the ethos theory is that class 
is related to the political movement. Reform politics would 
prosper in a middle-class environment while machine-type 
politics are best suited for lower-class environments (Stedman, 
1972; see also Lewis, 1973). Wolfinger and Field (1966) were 
among the early investigators to link ethos to government 
reform. Public-regardingness would lead to an advocacy of 
a governmental structure which would reduce the strength and 
power of groups concerned only with their own self-interest 
as opposed to the needs of the city as a whole.
The validity of the ethos concept has been questioned 
and the debate over its usefulness has continued (see Eckert, . 
1976; Plax, 1976). Hennessey C1970) criticized the ethos 
theory on the basis of conceptual and methodological issues.
Key terms such as "public interest" and "middle-class" were 
not clearly defined. Wilson and Banfield also committed an 
ecological fallacy by utilizing aggregate voting data as a 
basis for determining the attitudes of individual citizens. 
Hennessey noted that the choice of bond elections as measures
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of public regardingness served to predetermine upper-class 
areas as public-regarding and lower-class areas as private- 
regarding due to the fact that a majority of the benefits 
from such elections often accrue to residents of poorer 
neighborhoods.
The ethos theory has remained important regardless 
of the problems and conflicts it has generated. The concept 
of public and private regardingness does exist and is appeal­
ing to reformers. In fact, many reform efforts can be sup­
ported as public-regarding measures (Harrington, 1976). The 
reform movement did contain both structural and social reform 
wings. The social reformers attempted to achieve change 
through muckraking, social work programs, and through efforts 
to gain control of government as a means of changing policy 
(see Adams, 1911 and Holli, 1969). While the reformers were 
usually unsuccessful in their attempt to gain control of urban 
government, they did achieve success in changing the structure 
of government at the local level.
Structural reformers, acting in a public-regarding 
manner, placed an emphasis on achieving efficiency and economy 
in the operation of government. This concern with a business­
like approach to government is reflective of the upper-class 
background of many reformers. An examination of reform move­
ments are often the product of the actions of individuals drawn 
from the high echelons of the business community (Hays,
(1964) .
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The movement to restructure urban government sought 
to remove the influence of politics on administration, mini­
mize group cleavages, and to see the adoption of businesslike 
principles in the operation of the bureaucracy (Lineberry and 
Sharkansky, 1971). The basic elements for reform at the local 
level are then: at-large representation, nonpartisan elec­
tions, and the council-manager form of government. Each of 
these elements will be discussed separately.
The move to establish a system of at-large represen­
tation is tied to the conviction that public officials ought 
to be concerned with the welfare of the city as a whole. 
Electoral systems based on representation for wards was 
viewed as a mechanism for insuring the continuation of con­
flict between competing interests within the city. The 
device of at-large elections should, in theory, insure that 
city councilman would not be subject to excessive pressures 
from any single geographically concentrated group. Political 
cleavages would then be minimized.^
The adoption of nonpartisan elections was seen as 
an appropriate course of action to eliminate the influence of 
partisan politics in city administration. Reformers held the 
position that there was not a "Democratic" or "Republican" 
way to operate a city department. The reformers were con­
cerned with economical and efficient delivery of services. 
Business principles would be implemented in administrative 
practices most effectively in a politically neutral environ­
ment (Harrington, 1976: 106-9).
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The third element of reform involved elimination 
of the mayor form of government. Figures 2-1 and 2-2 present 
a graphic display of the strong and weak mayor governmental 
forms. These forms of city government to reformers allowed 
politics to affect administration. Administration was not 
insulated from potential entanglement in political conflicts.
A shortcoming of the weak mayor form was the difficulty in 
determining accountability. The city council was charged with 
responsibility for the operation of the various departments.
If the public became dissatisfied with the operation of a 
specific department, no single elected individual could be 
held accountable. However, his elective position allowed 
politics to become entangled with administration (Lineberry 
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Galveston, Texas, adopted the innovative commission 
form of government in 1900. Figure 2-3 represents the struc­
ture of government under a commission plan. This structural 
reform became an "ideal” type for reformers during the early 
part of the twentieth century. By 1910 this reform had been 
adopted by 108 cities (Lineberry and Sharkansky, 1971; 120).
The commission form did contain weaknesses that 
affected its ability to operate government in an efficient 
manner. Each commissioner was charged with the responsibility 
for a particular administrative department. In the absence of 
a single chief executive, coordination and administrative inte­
gration were difficult to achieve. The structure had the effect 
of encouraging the commissioners and their departments to act 
in an independent manner with minimal concern for departments 
other than their own.
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The reform movement, concerned with economy and
efficiency, turned away from the commission form in favor of
the council-manager structure. This form is presented in
Figure 2-4. The city manager acts as the chief executive
in administrative activity. He is insulated from politics
and acts only to implement policy decisions as they are made
in the city council. The dichotomy between politics and
administration was preserved.
In actual operation, the city manager does assume
a role in policy-making. This is especially true when the
council seeks his professional judgment. The city manager
does not find it possible to remain separate from politics.
Nevertheless, this structural form has been advocated as the
best form for the implementation of business principles in 
2government.
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The manager form of government, as reflected in 
Table 2-1, has been adopted by a majority of the cities in 
the population range 25,000 to 250,000. Smaller cities find 
the cost of hiring city managers to be a factor that is dif­
ficult to overcome. Larger cities tend to rely on mayoral 
forms of government.^
Table 2-1 presents a summary of the form of govern­
ment for cities with populations greater than 25,000.
T a b le  2 -1
City Government Forms by Size of City








Over 1,000,000 100 0 0 6
500,000 to 1,000,000 75 25 0 20
250,000 to 499,999 43 47 10 30
100,000 to 249,999 39 52 9 98
50,000 to 99,999 36 57 13 256
25,000 to 49,999 33 56 8 520






The conviction that structure affects public policy 
has served to motivate the urban reform movement. The ques­
tion must be asked: "Does structure affect policy?" Given
the assumptions of the ethos theory and the reform movement's 
concern with economy and efficiency, reformed cities should 
spend and tax at lower rates than unreformed cities (Morgan 
and Pelissero, 1978).
Previous research has produced mixed results with 
conflicting conclusions. It has been demonstrated that the 
council-manager form of government has been readily accepted 
by medium-sized cities. These cities are characterized by 
lower levels of ethnicity and religious diversity than larger 
cities. Homogeneity appears to facilitate the adoption of 
this particular governmental form (see Kessel, 1962; Alford 
and Scoble, 1965). Ethnicity seemed to be related to the 
mayoral form of government.
Wolfinger and Field C1966) questioned the importance 
of ethnicity as a factor in determining urban governmental 
structure. Their research indicated that region was an 
important element in determining the form of urban government. 
The findings of Dye and MacManus (1976) served to complicate 
the debate. Their research indicated that ethnicity (measured 
as percentage of foreign-born residents) was related to two 
reform elements while region determined the third. Ethnicity 
was related to governmental form (mayor or council-manager)
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and to the system of representation utilized on city councils 
(ward or at-large representation). Cities with high levels 
of ethnicity tended to have mayoral forms of government and a 
system of ward representation. Region was found to be related 
to the.existence of partisan politics in the election system 
(partisan or nonpartisan ballots).
Lineberry and Fowler (1967) focused on the effect of 
governmental structure on public policy apart from the effects 
of the demographic characteristics of the city. Relying on 
taxation and expenditure data as indicators of public policy, 
the authors utilized multiple regression for reformed and
4unreformed cities. The results indicated that socio-economic 
variables explained less variance in reformed than in unre­
formed cities. This lower explanatory power was attributed 
to the effect of structural reform.
When efforts have been directed toward examining the 
effects of reform structures on members of minority groups, 
conflicting results have again been produced. Karnig (1976) 
and Robinson and Dye (.1978) found that the reformed structures 
had the effect of minimizing or eliminating minority group 
membership on city councils. Cole (.1974) and MacManus (.1978) 
found that reform structures did not affect minority group 
representation.
Lyons C1978) examined expenditure patterns for re­
formed and unreformed cities. His conclusions were consistent 
with those of Lineberry and Fowler. Reformed cities did spend
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less than unreformed cities. Accordingly, the reform 
movement did have a policy impact.
Morgan and Pelissero (1978) observed that much of 
the previous research was cross-sectional in nature with the 
possibility that misleading results could be achieved. Their 
approach involved the application of time-series analysis to 
the problem. Reformed and unreformed cities were matched and 
analysis undertaken. Their findings indicated that no rela­
tionship existed between fiscal policy and governmental 
structure.
The observer is faced with conflicting evidence as 
attempts are made to draw conclusions concerning the impact 
of urban reform on public policy. It would be safe to make 
the assumption that structure is not related to policy.
Strong, compelling evidence to the contrary does not exist. 
Despite this lack of supporting data, reform groups continue 
to advocate structural change as one appropriate remedy for 
the problems facing America's cities.
State Legislative Reform
Efforts to reform government have also been directed 
toward state legislatures in an attempt to change public policy. 
These reforms have been structural in nature, reflecting an 
acceptance of the belief that structure is related to policy.
An examination of the effects of these reform efforts indicates 
that despite the conviction that structure is important, there 




One major attempt at state legislative reform 
involved the struggle for reapportionment. As population 
patterns changed in the United States, urban areas increased 
in size while rural areas suffered a decline. Equality of 
representation requires that equal numbers of people be con­
tained within the boundaries of all legislative districts 
within a state. When the population of legislative districts 
is grossly unequal, malapportionment exists. Until 1962, 
malapportionment characterized most of the legislative dis­
tricts within the states.
Evidence abounded that malapportionment was a nation­
wide condition.^ State legislatures manifested an unwilling­
ness to redraw district boundary lines after each census.
This unwillingness was a product of the realization that re- 
districting would result in the loss of influence for rural 
areas of the states. The legislators also reflected something 
of an anti-urban bias in their attitudes. Consequently, they 
were unwilling to change the existing district lines.
Initially the federal courts were unwilling to inter­
vene when afforded the opportunity to accept reapportionment 
cases.^ The Supreme Court reversed this line of reasoning 
when it ruled in Baker v. Carr (.1962) that the lower house of 
the Tennessee legislature must be reapportioned. Following 
this decision, the states began to eliminate malapportionment 
in the lower state houses. In 1964, the Supreme Court ruled
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both houses of state legislatures must be apportioned on the
basis of population (Reynolds v. Sims). The "federal analogy"
was firmly rejected by the courts as a basis for legislative 
7apportionment.
This legislative reform was grounded in the convic­
tion that an increase in the number of urban legislators at 
the state level would result in a change in state policy.
This change would result in a greater sympathy for the problems 
of urban areas by state legislatures (Dye, 1971). The reappor­
tionment effort did produce changes in the state legislatures. 
Rural areas lost representation while urban and suburban areas 
gained representation. Some evidence exists that the Demo­
cratic party gained strength in state legislatures in elections 
following reapportionment actions (Erickson, 1967).
When state policy is defined in terms of taxing and 
spending patterns, Frederickson and Cho (1971) utilized state 
fisi. al decisions and found that a bias against urban areas 
continued to exist even though that bias was stronger before 
the Baker v. Carr decision. Caution is the watchword in 
evaluating the impact of legislative reapportionment. Dye 
(1971) observed that;
. . . there is little evidence that the 'one man, 
one vote' movement will dramatically change the 
nature or extent of state involvement in urban 
problems, and reapportionment is not likely to 
solve any of the pressing problems of the nation's 
cities such as poverty, racial tension, slum 
housing, and congestion.
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The pattern of cities seeking assistance from the federal
ggovernment would continue after reapportionment. The 
effects of reapportionment on policy appear to be weak.
Legislative Structure 
and Public Policy
A growing body of literature has emerged examining 
the relationship between legislative structure and policy out­
puts of the states. The popular literature, citizen groups, 
and state legislators themselves have been critical of the 
performance of state legislatures. This has been especially 
true in the recent past. Concerns over low levels of com­
pensation, limited sessions and inadequate staff support are 
among the weaknesses that have been cited. Despite this con­
cern with legislative performance, it was not until the pub­
lication of the findings of the Citizen's Conference on State
9Legislatures CCCSL, 1971a, 1971b) that a uniform system for 
measuring legislative reform existed.
The findings of the Citizen's Conference are the 
result of a major research effort undertaken in 1969. The 
objective of the effort involved creating measures of effec­
tiveness of state legislatures. Karnig and Sigelman (1975) 
observed that "effectiveness is commonly defined as the extent 
to which a system attains its goals" and that the measures of 
the CCSL are, in reality, measures of the structures and pro­
cesses of legislatures. The CCSL measures should, therefore, 
be viewed as indicators of reform, not effectiveness.
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The legislatures were examined in nine basic 
fields (CCSL, 1971a; 1971b):
Staffing; The legislature should be equipped with 
a competent professional and clerical staff to perform their 
job.
Compensation: Salaries paid to legislators should
be commensurate with their responsibility. All necessary 
expenses incurred should be reimbursed by the state.
Time: Restrictions should not be imposed on the
length or frequency of legislative sessions.
Committee Structure: Committee assignments should
be reasonable; the number of committees should not be unman­
ageable; and all committee procedures should be available to 
the public.
Facilities; Adequate office space should be pro­
vided to individual legislators, the leaders, and support 
staff. Sufficient space for public hearings, press confer­
ences and caucus activities should be provided.
Leadership: Leadership selection should facilitate
the conduct of business and reflect a fair distribution of 
power.
Rules and Procedures: The public should be able
to readily comprehend the operation of the assembly. A mech­
anism for insuring a fair hearing for each bill introduced 
should exist.
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Size; Each house should be small enough to allow 
full participation by members. Excessive membership proves 
to be unmanageable.
Ethics: Lobbyists should be regulated and mecha­
nisms for resolving conflicts of interest should be established.
These nine fields were utilized to measure state 
legislatures along five dimensions; functionality, accounta­
bility, informedness, independence, and representativeness 
(CCSL, 1971b; ch. 5-9). These five dimensions were collec­
tively known as the FAIIR System. Each legislature was ranked 
on each dimension and an overall ranking was also generated.
The functional legislature can be described as the 
efficient legislature. A high score on this dimension re­
flected flexibility in the use of time, minimal restrictions 
on sessions, procedures to maintain the flow of work, adequate 
physical facilities, and sufficient staff support to handle 
relations with agencies and constituents.
The accountable legislature is accessible to the 
public. Accountability requires that forms and procedures 
of the legislature must be readily understood by the public.
The public also has easy access to the operations of the 
legislature. This can be facilitated with an openness to 
the press. Votes should be recorded and the voting records 
of members made public. Single-member districts and a sys­
tem of protecting the rights of the minority party are also 
required.
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The informed legislature is capable of collecting, 
analyzing and applying information. A high score on this 
dimension required the presence of professional staffs for 
gathering and processing information and a mechanism for 
standing committees to conduct investigations. A high score 
also required the ability to review and change the budget as 
submitted by the governor.
The independent legislature is autonomous from the 
other branches of government. The legislature is independent 
of the exécutive branch and equal to it in power. The legis­
lature also has the power to gather information on its own, 
independent of the influences of lobbyists. The legislature 
also has the ability to engage in program oversight and 
evaluation. >
The representative legislature reflects the varied 
interests and groups within the state. A high score on this 
dimension requires that single-member districts be coupled 
with minimal restrictions for office seekers (age, residence) 
and that compensation be at relatively high levels. Indi­
vidual legislators should not be subject to the excessive 
concentration of power in the hands of the leadership.
The five FAIIR dimensions are not mutually exclusive. 
An independent legislature must also be an informed legisla­
ture. Legislative accountability is also linked to repre­
sentativeness. The criteria utilized for each of the dimen­
sions is also subject to debate. Alternatives can be
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formulated. Despite any problems that might be encountered, 
the FAIIR System incorporates the reform recommendations 
advocated by most groups (Ritt, 1973). The CCSL model has 
been utilized as a major point of departure for analysis of 
legislative reform in the 1970s.
Grumm (1971), using slightly different measures than 
did the Citizen's Conference, found that "structure does affect 
legislative performance." He found that apportionment was 
a significant factor in determining education policy and that 
legislative professionalism had a significant impact on wel­
fare policy. These results offered support to the conviction 
that state policy outputs could be affected by structural 
reforms. Grumm stated that his findings were tentative in 
nature and recognized the necessity for additional research.
Ritt (1973) utilized the FAIIR System as measures 
of legislative structure in an analysis of the relationship 
between reformed structure and policy. His findings were in 
conflict with those of Grumm two years earlier. When policy 
was measured as expenditure levels, Ritt found no difference 
between the policy outcomes of reformed and unreformed 
legislatures.
Karnig and Sigelman (.1975) also utilized the FAIIR 
System in their analysis of the impact of legislative reform 
on public policy. They concluded that both Grumm and the 
Citizen's Conference (CCSL) were in error in claiming that 
legislative reform had an impact on policy. The authors
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noted that Grumm's results were suspect due to the fact that 
twelve of his twenty-eight policy variables were measures of 
state and local output, which should not relate to legisla­
tive reform.
Grumm (.1973) again found that legislative institu­
tionalization did have an effect on selected policy measures. 
Legislative structure did affect welfare policy, education 
policy and health policy (Grumm, 1973: 62).
LeLoup (1976) returned to the FAIIR System in an 
analysis of the relationship between policy and legislative 
reform. The results indicated that when important socio­
economic characteristics of the states are considered, legis­
lative reform has little effect on public policy. Ritt (1977) 
updated his 1973 study with more recent expenditive data and 
found no change from his earlier findings of no relationship 
between structure and policy.
Several case studies have been conducted in exami­
nation of the impact of reform on policy (.see Grove, 1977; 
McDowell, 1977; Balutis, 1977). These efforts have continued 
to support the finding that structure is not a determinant 
of policy.
There is almost complete agreement in the literature 
that public policy is not affected by the reform of state 
legislative structures. Yet the public, reform groups, and 
public officials continue to advocate legislative reform as 
an appropriate remedy for the shortcomings of state
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legislatures. The situation is not unlike that surrounding 
the question of urban reform.
State Administrative Reorganization
In the same manner that urban reform can be broken 
down into three elements and legislative reform classified 
along five dimensions, state reorganization can be classified 
in an accepted typology developed by George Bell (1973, 1974). 
He observed that state executive organizations fell into 
three categories; traditional, cabinet, and secretary 
coordinator.
The traditional type involves simply a reduction 
in the number of state agencies within the existing organiza­
tional framework. The structure of elected officials, boards, 
and commissions is retained with minor changes. The cabinet 
type is characterized by an acceptance of orthodox adminis­
trative theory in which department heads are appointed by and 
accountable to the governor. The secretary-coordinator type 
involves very little structural change. The department secre­
taries assume a coordinating role and are interposed between 
the governor and the departments of government. Table 2-2 
presents the typology utilized by states reorganizing after 
1965.
Bell's typology makes it possible to "get a handle" 
on reorganization efforts. The acceptance of his classifi­
cation scheme is reflected by its adoption as an analytical
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Table 2-2
















^Kentucky adopted a combination of the cabinet and 
secretary-coordinator types.
^The reorganization in Louisiana also contained 
elements from the traditional and secretary-coordinator 
types.
SOURCE: Bell (1974), and Garnett and Levine (1978).
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framework by other researchers (see Ehrlich, 1975; Peirce,
1975; and Gottlieb, 1976). The inclusion of both structural 
and legal elements in the typology provides utility for both 
basic and applied investigative efforts. Table 2-3 presents 
the effects of each reorganization type across five adminis­
trative dimensions. The utility of Bell's typology becomes 
evident as it clearly presents the potential results from the 
adoption of any of the three reorganization types.
The Impact of State Reorganization
While the typology developed by Bell does allow an 
understanding of the degree of structural change generated 
by administrative reorganization, it does not provide a frame­
work for determining the impact of reorganization on the oper­
ation of the state bureaucracy. The questions surrounding the 
effect of reorganization on economy and efficiency remain 
unanswered. The literature has suggested that structure is 
not related to policy outputs for either state legislatures 
or urban governments. Structural reform in these two areas 
would probably have only a symbolic importance.
Very little empirical research has been conducted 
examining the impact of state executive reorganization on 
public policy. The notable exceptions are the efforts by 
Meier (.1979) and Garnett and Levine (1978). The findings 
by Meier indicate the reorganization does not appear to have 
an impact on public policy. If these conclusions are sup­
ported by the results of additional research efforts, the
Table 2-3 
















Traditional High Low Low High High
Cabinet Medium Medium Moderate Moderate Low
Secretary-





SOURCE: Adapted from Garnett and Levine (1978).
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utility of expending limited resources would then be 
questioned.
This research effort will be directed toward an 
examination of the impact of reorganization on a wide range 
of public policy measures. If the results are consistent 
with the findings for urban reform and legislative reform, 
then the movement to reorganize state bureaucracy becomes 
an exercise in futility.
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Notes
^Members of minority groups have expressed the 
opinion that at-large systems serve to prevent minority 
representation on city councils. Some cities that have 
initiated this particular reform have found it necessary 
to defend their electoral system in the federal courts.
Keech (1972) found that the Black community could affect 
policy only,when a ward system was used or when Blacks 
constituted a majority of the registered voters in a city.
2These business principles include;
1. Grouping activities by purpose, process or 
clientele;
2. Hierarchical organization structure;
3. Narrow "span of control";
4. A clear "chain of command";
5. Personnel appointments and promotion on 
the basis of ability;
6. Executives should control the expenditures 
of administrative units;
7. Executives should have the authority to 
appoint and remove subordinates. (Lepawsky, 
1949; chapter 8).
^Brett W. Hawkins presents a discussion of the 
environmental correlates of urgan governmental forms in 
chapter 2 of Politics and Urban Policies. He reached the 
guarded conclusion that social and economic factors appear 
to have an effect on the structure of urban government,
^Reformed cities were defined as those with the 
council-manager or commission form of government, nonpartisan 
elections, and at-large representation.
^David and Eisenberg (1961) found that the "value" 
of votes cast by urban legislators was significantly lower 
than that for rural legislators. Dauer and Kelsay (1955) 
had found similar results in their earlier study.
®The courts argued that citizens could remedy the 
problem by electing legislators sympathetic to their pleas 
and willing to adopt redistricting plans (Colegrove v. Green, 
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
The "federal analogy" involved citing the fact 
that the U.S. Senate is apportioned on a geographical basis 
while the U.S. House of Representatives is apportioned on 
the basis of population. Some states used the federal model 
in an attempt to justify malapportionment in the upper house 
of the state legislature.
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gFor additional discussion on state legislative 
reapportionment, see Dye (1965), Jacob (1965), and Brady 
and Edmonds (1966).
9The findings were released in two versions. The 
official report was published by Praeger while a popularized 
version entitled The Sometime Governments was published by 
Bantam Books the same year.
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY
While the advocates of state executive branch 
reorganization have consistently argued that increased economy 
and efficiency of government operations will be achieved 
after implementation of a well-planned reorganization, very 
little empirical research has been conducted to determine the 
validity of this basic assumption. The bulk of the literature 
has been directed toward presenting techniques for achieving 
reorganization and making claims for the anticipated benefits 
which executive branch reorganization will produce (see 
Buck, 1950; Fain, 1977; Hawkins, 1978a; Watson, 1978; and 
Weinberger, 1978).
One exception is the work of Meier (1980; 396-412)
which examined the impact of state executive reorganization 
on employment and expenditures for sixteen states which recognized 
after 1965. Meier found that executive branch reorganization 
did not result in either a long or short term reduction in 
employment or expenditures at the state level. Despite these 
negative findings, Meier was unwilling to draw the conclusion 
that reorganization served no useful purpose. He hypothesized
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that while total expenditures and total employment might 
remain unaffected, reorganization might have an impact on 
specific policy areas as a result of the strengthened execu­
tive control over the bureaucracy. This research is intended 
to investigate that question.
Socioeconomic and Political Correlates 
of Public Policy
Since the 1950s the social science literature has 
contained numerous studies examining the effect of social, 
economic, and political variables on public policy.^ While 
this research effort focuses exclusively on the relationship 
between one political variable (reorganization) and public 
policy, it follows the trend established by the earlier 
research. It is therefore useful to review some of the 
findings and assumptions from the previous studies.
A classic investigation of the determinants of 
public policy was that of Solomon Fabricant (1952) which 
examined the relationship between state and local expenditures 
and certain socioeconomic variables. Fabricant found that 
72 percent of the variation in per capita expenditure could 
be explained by three variables; per capita income, popula­
tion density and percent urban. When these variables were 
utilized to predict spending in specific functional categories, 
their explanatory power remained high. Fabricant's focus and 
methodology served to guide much of the subsequent public 
policy research.
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Glen Fisher (1962; 349-55) expanded Fabricant's
findings by utilizing his multiple regression approach and 
socioeconomic independent variables in a study of the deter­
minants of state expenditure policy. Fisher found that while 
the explanatory power of the socioeconomic variables had 
decreased since 1952, they retained a "high level of explana­
tory power relative to absolute levels of expenditure."
Fisher published a later article (1964) in the National Tax 
Journal examining state expenditure policy following this same 
approach with results which supported Fabricant's original 
findings. While the orientation of these early efforts 
focused primarily on the relationship between socioeconomic 
characteristics of states and public policy, later investigators 
attempted to include independent variables which reflected the 
political environment of the state.
Thomas Dye (1966, 1969a, 1969b) published a number
of studies which included socioeconomic and political variables
in an attempt to explain state policies. In Politics, Economics,
and the Public, Dye utilized correlation and multiple regression
to analyze the effect of a wide range of socioeconomic and
political variables on public policy. He was successful in
explaining up to 74 percent of the variance in some categories
2of per capita expenditures. This relatively high level of 
explanatory power was partially a result of including a large 
number of socioeconomic and political measures as independent 
variables in the regression analysis. Even though Dye did not
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show restraint as he formulated his equations, his results
were consistent with the earlier findings of Fabricant and
Fisher. Dye's research did add to the understanding of policy
choices in that he found that socioeconomic variables had a
much stronger influence on public policy than did political
variables. In his words:
" . . .  correlation analysis reveals that these 
political system characteristics have rela­
tively little independent effect on policy 
outcomes in the states. Economic development 
shapes both the political system and political 
outcomes, and most of the association that 
occurs between system characteristics and 
policy outcomes can be attributed to the in­
fluence of economic development. Differences 
in the policy choices of states with different 
types of political systems turn out to be 
largely a product of different socioeconomic 
levels rather than a direct product of political 
variables." (Dye, 1966: 293)
Public policy, when measured as per capita expenditures, did 
not seem to be associated strongly with political variables.
Dye (1969a) also examined the relationship between 
state executive structure and public policy.^ Fragmentation 
of structure was measured as the number of popularly elected 
executive branch officials. As the number of officials 
appointed by the governor increased, the degree of fragmen­
tation decreased. The study failed to reveal any differences 
between the policy choices of fragmented and unfragmented 
state governments. Dye concluded that fragmented and unfrag­
mented state executives pursued the same policies and that 
the differences that did exist could be attributed to socio­
economic factors. Policy did not appear to be a consequence
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of the organizational structure of the state executive branch 
of government.
Ira Sharkansky investigated the factors influencing 
public policy in a series of studies (1971; 1969; 1968; 1967a; 
1967b). His findings were generally consistent with those 
of Dye. The explanatory power of socioeconomic variables was 
found to be far greater than was the explanatory power of 
political variables, although Sharkansky did include certain 
governmental variables (e.g., level of previous state spending) 
that proved to be important predictors.
Other researchers began to focus on the relationship 
between political variables and specific policy areas. Dawson 
and Robinson (1963) found that the relationship between inter­
party competition and state welfare policy existed only when 
per capita income measures were excluded. When per capita 
income was introduced, the relationship between party compe­
tition and welfare policy disappeared. Cnudde and McCrone 
(1969) found similar results in their later study. Socioeconomic 
variables reduced the impact of party competition on state 
welfare policies.
Richard Hofferbert (1966) followed the approach of 
Dawson and Robinson in their study of the relationship between 
policy and political variables. Hofferbert controlled for 
region (South, non-South) in his analysis and found that even 
with controls for geographic region, political variables con­
tinued to have very little impact on public policy.
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The conclusion drawn consistently in the literature 
is that public policy is primarily a product of the socio­
economic environment of the states and that the impact of 
political variables is minimal (see Dye, 1967; Jacob and 
Lipsky, 1968; Pulsipher and Weatherby, 1968; Hanson, 1963; 
Sullivan, 1973; and Carmines, 1974).
It should be noted that virtually all of the studies 
examining the relationship between socioeconomic and political 
variables and public policy have been cross-sectional in 
nature. There has not been an attempt to examine the effects 
of structural changes on state policy over time. It has 
been observed that these two approaches can produce drama­
tically different results (Gray, 1976). This research effort 
will employ time-series analysis in an attempt to determine 
if structural change produces policy changes over time. It is 
possible that the earlier research failed to find evidence of 
a link between policy and political system characteristics 
due to the nature of the cross-sectional research design 
employed.
The Selection of States 
and Policy Areas for Analysis
In any effort to determine the effect of reorgani­
zation (or any other variable) on public policy, it is necessary 
to operationalize a measure of public policy. The approach 
which has gained wide acceptance in the literature is the 
use of expenditures as a measure of public policy. In keeping
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with the established convention, this research will also employ
4state expenditures as measures of policy.
As stated in chapter one, nineteen states have under­
gone extensive executive branch reorganization since 1965.
The research design to be employed requires that each reorgan­
ized state be matched with a similar unreorganized state for 
control purposes. This would involve including some thirty- 
eight states in the analysis. Annual expenditure data for 
over twenty functional categories for every state is readily 
available in the Bureau of Census publication State Government 
Finance, If all expenditure categories and all reorganized 
states were selected for analysis, it would be necessary to 
utilize some 760 regression equations in the analysis,^ As 
will be discussed in the following section, the regression 
equations are simply the first step in the analysis process. 
Residuals from each equation must be examined to determine 
whether or not autocorrelation exists. If autocorrelation is 
discovered, further steps must be taken before the results 
can be analyzed with any effective degree of accuracy. This 
clearly borders on taking a "shotgun" approach to the investi­
gation and involves a level of analysis that is beyond the 
scope of this research effort. In order to reduce the task 
to manageable proportions, a theoretically justifiable method 
of selection became a necessity. The following approach was 
employed.
The general research question guiding this investi­
gation involves determining whether or not reorganization has
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an impact on specific policy areas due to increased gubernatorial 
control over the state bureaucracy. It would be possible to
select the five or six policy areas for analysis which account
for the majority of each state's budget. This would include; 
education, highways, welfare and health for most states. How­
ever, the selection of these policy areas would not allow the
research question to be answered with complete confidence.
Not all governors are equally concerned with the same policy 
areas and therefore could fail to exercise the increased 
degree of control possible after reorganization. Also, some 
of these policy areas are frequently beyond the direct con-
g
trol of the governor. The most satisfactory technique re­
quires that the priorities of the individual governors deter­
mine the policy areas to be selected for analysis.
This can be accomplished by examining either the 
inauguration address or the state of the state message delivered 
by the governor holding office at the time a reorganization is 
effected. Through content analysis of these messages, the 
priorities of the governors can be determined. This infor­
mation was obtained for fourteen of the nineteen reorganized
7states. Twelve of the messages contained substantial references 
to specific policy areas of concern to the governors. The 
messages of Governor Russell W. Peterson (Delaware) and Governor 
Edwin Edwards (Louisiana) did not contain references to spe­
cific policy concerns of the newly elected governors. Table 3-1 
presents a summary of the policy areas selected for analysis
Table 3-1 
Policy Areas Selected for Analysis
state Governor Reorganization Policy Areas
California Reagan 1968 Education, Welfare, 
Police
Natural Resources,
Colorado Love 1968 Education, Natural Resources, Police
Georgia Carter 1973 Education, Natural Resources, Police
Idaho Andrus 1974 Natural Resources
Kentucky Ford 1973 Education, Natural Resources, Health, Police
Massachusetts Sargeant 1971 Welfare, Highways, 
Health
Natural Resources, Police,
Maryland Mandel 1970 Education, Welfare, Health, Police
Missouri Bond 1974 Education, Welfare, 
Highways
Natural Resources,
Maine Curtis 1971 Education, Natural 
Police
Resources, Highways,
South Dakota Kneip 1973 Natural Resources
Virginia Holton 1973 Education, Natural Resources, Highways





based on the priorities of the governors. After successfully 
reducing the number of policy areas to a manageable size, 
the next task involved matching each of the reorganized states 
with a similar unreorganized state.
The policy areas displayed in table 3-1 represent 
a relatively wide range of policy concerns. It is interesting 
to note that the number of areas of gubernatorial concern 
appear to be related to population density and region. The 
governors of the two sparcely populated states mentioned only 
one policy area. The governors of the southern states men­
tioned three or four areas of concern while the governors of 
the industrialized states were concerned with five or six 
policy areas. This might be a manifestation of different 
political cultures which mold attitudes concerning the proper 
role of state government. A final determination of these 
issues is beyond the scope of this research effort.
The experimental states were the reorganized states
selected for analysis based on the availability of the
governors' policy preferences. Each experimental state
must be matched with a control (unreorganized) state. This
matching procedure was accomplished by using Luttbeg's (1971)
8classification of the American states. It is necessary that 
a close match be made for the experimental and control 
state (Cook and Scioli, 1975: 114). A close match requires
that the two states share similar socioeconomic and political 
characteristics with similar policy choices before the
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intervention (reorganization). Any observed policy changes 
after reorganization might then be attributed to the inter­
vention.
Luttbeg's factor analysis produced loadings of 
each state on one of four factors: Industrialization,
Southern, Sparce Population and Frontier. Table 3-2 presents 
the matched states based on the factor loadings.
Examination of the pairs can result in questions 
concerning the validity of the matching process. One problem 
involves the match of California and New York. Both states 
loaded highly on the industrialization factor (.72 and .85 
respectively) but are on opposite coasts. The eleven re­
maining pairs are matched with states within the same geo­
graphic region. Yet matching California with any other 
state does not seem feasible. Other states present problems 
as well. Virginia should probably be matched with North 
Carolina instead of South Carolina, but this is not possible 
because North Carolina reorganized in 1971. Considering 
these and other limitations, the matches produced seem
9acceptable for the purpose of this research effort.
The Research Design
As noted in the first section of this chapter, most 
of the analyses in the literature investigating public policy 
have been cross-sectional in nature. In this research effort 
a quasi-experimental multiple time-series design is employed
Table 3-2 

















Kentucky Southern .75 Tennessee Southern .93
Massachusetts Industrial .72 New Jersey Industrial .81
Maryland Industrial .45 Pennsylvania Industrial .79
Missouri Southern .48 Oklahoma Southern .61
Maine Industrial .48 New Hampshire Industrial .58
South Dakota Sparce
Population
.89 North Dakota Sparce
Population
.84
Virginia Southern .62 South Carolina Southern .92
Wisconsin Industrial .64 Minnesota Industrial .59
Category and factor loading based on Luttbeg's (1971) analysis.
^While all three factors were used to match the state, only the highest 
factor loading for each state is displayed.
00U)
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{see Campbell and Stanley, 1966: 55-7). In order to
properly investigate the impact of reorganization on policy, 
this longitudinal approach is better suited to the task 
than a cross-sectional study which is limited to one time 
period. If reorganization has an impact on policy, the 
spending patterns of the state will be altered. If increased 
economy and efficiency of operations is derived from a re­
organization, any given state will spend less after a reorgani­
zation than if it had not reorganized. The research question 
and theory are tied to a longitudinal as opposed to a cross- 
sectional design.
Since the research question is longitudinal in 
nature, it is necessary to test for both long and short term 
effects. Government reorganization is marked by a change in 
the normal operating procedures of the bureaucracy. It can 
therefore be treated as an intervention in a quasi-experiment 
following Campbell and Stanley (1966). The state expenditures 
which have been selected as measures of public policy can be 
observed over time. It is then possible to test for both 
long and short term effects through the utilization of the 
time-series design in the following diagram:
»1 »3 °4 X »5 “6 “ 7 “S
In this diagram the characters 0., 0 . . . 0  are observa-i z 8
tions of state policy, as measured by per capita expendi­
tures, for every year. The X represents the intervention 
or the reorganization. It is possible to assess the impact
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of reorganization on policy by comparing the levels of 
expenditures before and after the intervention. This par­
ticular design was typical of that utilized in the experi­
ments in the nineteenth-century physical and biological 
sciences (Campbell and Stanley, 1966: 37).
This particular approach eliminates many of the 
internal and external validity^^ threats. The internal 
threats of maturation, testing, instrumentation, regression, 
selection, mortality and interaction between any number of 
these threats are eliminated by this design. The design is 
subject to three external threats: (1) interaction between
testing (gathering the expenditure data) and the experi­
mental intervention (the act of reorganization), (2) inter­
action between selection for inclusion in the study and 
the intervention and (3) reactive arrangements resulting 
from exposure to the experimental intervention.
These external validity threats are of no concern 
to this investigation and can be dismissed without worry.
The first threat can be dismissed since the data are reported 
by all states on an annual basis without regard for the 
implementation of any reorganization. Data gathering does 
not affect the behavior of the states. The second threat 
is not a problem since selection for inclusion in this study 
cannot interact with the process of reorganization. The 
third threat is of no concern since the reorganization 
intervention takes place in the "real world" where reactive 
arrangements from an experimental setting cannot occur.
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The one serious threat from this particular design 
is internal: history (Campbell and Stanley, 1966). The
design fails to eliminate the possibility that any policy 
change might be the product of some other event or combina­
tion of events occurring at the same time as the intervention. 
This problem has been illustrated in the classic analysis 
of the 1956 crackdown on speeding by the state of Connecticut 
(Campbell and Ross, 1968). Before the crackdown the number 
of highway fatalities in Connecticut was recorded as 324.
The year after the crackdown (1956) the number of fatalities 
had been reduced by 12.3 percent to 284. Public officials 
hailed the program as a success and worthy of continuation 
due to the dramatic reduction in the highway death rate.
The problem is that other plausible explanations for the 
decrease in fatalities existed. The safety factor for auto­
mobiles might have changed,weather conditions could have 
changed resulting in safer driving conditions, new highway 
construction might have eliminated hazardous sections of 
roadway, and any number of other events might have transpired 
to make driving less dangerous than in the period preceding 
the crackdown. The approach utilized by Campbell and Ross 
involved treating Connecticut as the experimental state and 
then comparing traffic fatality data with similar states 
which had not experienced a crackdown on speeding. The 
researchers adopted a multiple time-series design to minimize 
the threat of history.
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The multiple time series design is illustrated in 
the following diagram;
Experimental State 0^ 0^ 0^ 0^ X 0^ Og 0^ Og
Control State 0̂  ̂Og Og 0^ Og Og 0^ Og
If each of the experimental states is carefully matched with 
a similar control state, the threat of history is minimized. 
Since both states exhibit similar socioeconomic and political 
characteristics, any policy change observed after the re­
organization can safely be attributed to the reorganization. 
As a result of utilizing this design, the validity threats 
are minimized, and the analysis should provide an accurate 
assessment of the policy consequences of state executive 
branch reorganization.
After operationalizing this design, the next step 
involves selecting a procedure for evaluating the policy 
impact of reorganization. It is possible for reorganization 
to have four different effects on policy. These effects can 
be displayed graphically as in figure 3-1. The vertical 
line in the figure indicates the point at which the reorgani­
zation was implemented. The solid line "A" represents no 
change in policy following the intervention (reorganization). 
The slope of the line remains unchanged. Line "B" indicates 
that the reorganization did in fact have a short term effect. 
A distinct downward shift occurred for the year after the 
reorganization (this is a change in the intercept or level of
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spending), yet the slope of the line remains unchanged.
The dotted line "C" represents a long term impact. The 
intercept remains unchanged, but the slope of the line has 
decreased. The state continues to spend more but does so 
at a reduced rate. Finally, line "D" represents both long 
and short term effects. There is an immediate change in 
level (the intercept) which is accompanied by a long term 
change in slope. In this case, the level of spending is
reduced following a reorganization, and the increase in
] 2spending occurs at a reduced rate. Given the strong state­
ments made in support of reorganization by its proponents, 
the time-series analysis should produce a line similar to 
either "B," "C " or "D."
While it is possible to utilize a graph to display 
the relationship between spending and reorganization over 
time for each state and each policy area, it would be diffi­
cult to arrive at an accurate analysis based on a visual 
"eyeballing" of the charts. A more reliable approach requires 
that the effects be estimated statistically. This can be 
accomplished in a regression equation in which time is the 
independent variable used to predict the level of spending. 
Such an equation is represented in the following model 
(McCain and McCleary, 1979):
Where is a state's level of per capita spending, 
is a time variable coded 1, 2, 3, . . . n, 
a is a constant.
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is an error term, 
and is the slope estimated by regression.
Since this research effort is concerned with both 
the interruption and with post-intervention change, an inter­
rupted time-series equation is used. The following model 
represents this regression equation:
Y = a + b^X^ + bgXg + b^X^ + e
where Y is a state's level of spending,
X^ is a time variable coded 1, 2, 3, . . . n,
Xg is dummy variable equal to zero before the
reorganization and 1 after the reorganization, 
Xg is equal to zero before the reorganization and 
is a time variable after the reorganization 
(e.g., 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 3), 
a is a constant, 
e is an error term, 
and b^, bg» b^ are the slopes estimated by multiple 
regression.
It is possible to estimate the long and short term effects of 
reorganization with this model. The parameter bg represents 
a change in the level (intercept) following a reorganization.
If this value is statistically significant and greater than 
zero, the reorganization produced a short term effect. The 
parameter bg represents a post-intervention change in slope.
If this value is statistically significant and greater than
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zero, the reorganization produced a long term effect. If 
no effect is produced, the time parameter will so accurately 
predict state spending that neither the intercept (bg) nor 
the slope (b̂ ) will be significantly different^^ from zero.
This regression equation is the first step in the 
statistical analysis. The results produced may be threatened 
by autocorrelation (see Hibbs, 1974: McCain and McCleary,
1979). When autocorrelation exists, a higher correlation 
exists for adjacent time points than for those located some 
distance away. This can be a problem in expenditure analysis 
due to the incremental nature of policy decisions (see 
Wildavsky, 1964). The presence of autocorrelation may result 
in autocorrelated regression residuals which will produce 
an underestimation of the errors in the regression coefficients. 
If this problem is not addressed, the model may overestimate 
the difference between pre- and post-intervention. This 
means that the significance of the reorganization will be 
overestimated.
Fortunately the problem of autocorrelation can be 
handled through application of a series of techniques known 
as ARIMA: autoregressive integrated moving average (Box
and Jenkins, 1970; Pack, 1976; Hibbs, 1974). Basically the 
procedure involves examining the residuals produced by 
ordinary least squares regression to determine whether or 
not autocorrelation exists. If the residuals are not auto­
correlated, the regression estimates may be considered unbiased
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and interpreted accordingly. If the residuals are autocorrelated, 
the Box-Jenkins procedures may be utilized to identify the 
nature of the autocorrelation and arrive at new estimates for 
the regression model. In the event that autocorrelation is 
found to exist, the exact procedures to be followed will be 
explained in greater detail as part of the analysis.
The interrupted time-series analysis involves four 
basic steps. First, multiple regression is utilized to 
estimate the model and produce the residuals. Second, the 
residuals are examined for autocorrelation. If the residuals 
resemble "white noise" then autocorrelation is not a problem 
and the researcher may move directly to step four. The 
third step is taken when the residuals are autocorrelated 
and involves a series of actions. An ARIMA model is identi­
fied and used to make new estimates and calculate new residuals. 
Only when these residuals resemble "white noise" is it possible 
to move to step four. A series of iterations may be required 
at this step. The fourth step involves interpreting the 
inferential statistics produced by the regression and evalua­
ting the impact of the intervention (reorganization in this 
case).
Summary
This research, effort focuses on an examination of 
the effects of executive branch reorganization on selected 
state policies as measured by per capita expenditures. Each 
reorganized state was matched with a similar unreorganized
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state as a technique to control for the internal threat of 
history. The effect of reorganization can be estimated by 
comparing the direction and statistical significance of the 
regression coefficients for the matched states in each 
policy area. Reorganization will be evaluated as having 
an impact only when the regression coefficients for the 
reorganized states are different from those for the unre­
organized states. If no difference exists between the co­




^Socioeconomic variables measure the demographic 
and economic characteristics of a state. Examples of these 
types of variables include: percent urban, percent rural,
per capita income, percent industrialized, percent white, 
percent employed in agriculture and population density. 
Political variables measure the political characteristics 
of a state. Examples of political varriables include: level
of party competition, percent vote for either the Democratic 
or Republican party in general elections, measures of par­
tisan control of state government, and measures of the 
structure of government (i.e., fragmented, non-fragmented; 
reorganized, unreorganized).
2Dye (1966) employed a lengthy list of independent 
variables in his equations. Some of these were highly 
correlated with each other. This approach of including large 
numbers of often highly correlated independent variables 
opens the door to problems of multicolinearity which threaten 
the validity of the analysis.
^Dye's (1966) approach was cross sectional in 
nature. He did not attempt to match fragmented and unfrag­
mented states and employ a quasi-experimental design.
^It can be argued that expenditures are not an 
adequate measure of policy. While most researchers would 
prefer to utilize some other measure of policy, alternative 
measures are neither as readily available nor as easily 
operationalized.
^The figure 760 was obtained by multiplying thirty- 
eight states (nineteen reorganized matched with nineteen 
unreorganized) times twenty functional expenditure or policy 
areas (38 x 20 = 760).
^Higher education is one example. In most states 
the college and university system is insulated from the 
direct control of the governor by Boards of Regents or 
Coordinating Boards. Government reorganizations do not 
generally tamper with this insulated status of higher education.
^For a variety of reasons it was not possible to 
obtain the necessary information for the following states: 
Arkansas (1971), Florida (1968), Michigan (1965), Montana 
(1971) and North Carolina (1971).
OLuttbeg's analysis involved the use of data for 
1960, which are somewhat dated today. It was selected as a 
guide due to the absence of other appropriate classification 
schemes in the literature.
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g The matching procedure was based on the loadings 
of each state on all four factors produced by Luttbeg. The 
matched-pairs produced are therefore the best possible com­
bination given the constraints involved. Where the matched 
pairs are not as similar as would be desired, the conclusions 
of the analysis must be considered as tentative in nature.
^^Internal validity concerns determining whether 
or not the intervention did in fact cause a change. In this 
study, internal validity asks the question: "Did the reorgan­
ization make a difference in state policy?" The threat to 
internal validity involves attributing change to reorganiza­
tion when some other force or factor actually produced the 
change. External validity involves the issue of generaliza- 
bility to other states. If the results cannot be generalized 
to other states, the results of the analysis are of reduced 
value.
^^In September of 1955 the Ford Motor Company intro­
duced its 1956 model line with several safety improvements. 
These included seat belts, deep dish steering wheels, and an 
improved collapsing steering column. While the number of 
1956 model Ford Motor Company vehicles would be a small per­
centage of vehicles on the highways, this introduction of a 
major change in the inherent safety of a particular motor 
vehicle illustrates the plausibility of alternate explanations 
for the decrease in traffic deaths.
12It should be noted that an actual decline in state 
spending is not required to produce a statistically significant 
change in intercept. A sharp one-year slowdown in the rate of 
spending might yield the same effect.
^^In social science literature the issues surround­
ing tests of significance have been debated thoroughly (see 
Skipper and Nuss, 1967; Labovitz, 1968; Selvin, 1957; Kish, 
1959; Gold, 1969; and Winch and Campbell, 1969). For purposes 
of this research, the .01 level of significance was selected.
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS
Analysis of the data was accomplished through 
the application of the quasi-experimental time-series tech­
nique discussed in Chapter III. A total of seven policy 
areas were incorporated based on the criterion of gubernatorial 
concern. These policy areas and the reorganized states in 
which they were issues of importance to the governors, as 
indicated in either their inauguration address or state of 
the state message, are listed in table 4-1. Interrupted time- 
series regression was performed for each reorganized state 
and its matched pair state for the appropriate policy areas 
as listed in the table. As a result, forty-two regression 
equations were produced for analysis.^
These regression equations are presented in table 4-2 
for the reorganized states and in table 4-3 for the unreorgan­
ized states. The interpretation of the regression coefficients 
presented in these tables allow an evaluation of the impact 
of state executive branch reorganization on public policy.
The dependent variable in each equation is per 




Policy Areas Selected for Analysis
Policy Area Reorganized States Included
Agriculture South Dakota
Education California, Colorado, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Missouri, Virginia, Wisconsin
Health Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts
Highways Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, 
Virginia, Wisconsin
Natural Resources California, Colorado, Georgia, 
Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, South 
Dakota, Virginia, Wisconsin
Police California, Colorado, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Missouri
Welfare California, Maryland, Massachu­
setts, Missouri, Wisconsin
T a b le  4 -2
Regression Coefficients for OLS Equations for Reorganized States 
to Test for Significance of Change Due to Administrative 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































^The average annual per capita increase.
ow
The short-term effect, expressed as the per capita dollars added to or 
subtracted from the budget in the year immediately following reorganization.
^The long-term effect, expressed as the average change in the annual 
budget over the period of five years following reorganization.
 ̂ *The Q statistic is interpreted by using the Chi Square distribution with
3 degrees of freedom. A value of 11.341 is required for statistical signifiance at 
the .01 level. Autocorrelation is of concern only if the Q is significant.
T a b le  4 -3
Regression Coefficients for OLS Equations 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































Since these states did not experience a reorganization, a true 
intervention did not occur. The intercept and slope parameters were computed as if 
the state had reorganized at the same time as the reorganized state with which it is 
matched.
The Q statistic is interpreted by using the Chi Square distribution with 
3 degrees of freedom. A value of 11.341 is required for statistical significance at 
the .01 level. Autocorrelation is of concern only if the Q is significant.
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in the extreme left column. For example, in table 4-2, the 
first equation used per capita expenditures for education in 
California as the dependent variable. This procedure was 
followed in all subsequent equations.
The independent variables are listed across the 
top of the table and are labeled "time,” "intervention 
intercept," and "intervention slope." Each of these will 
be discussed separately. The first independent variable 
"time" is a measure of the average annual per capita change 
in spending for the policy area under investigation. It 
corresponds to in the regression equation. The second 
independent variable "intervention intercept" is a measure 
of the short-term impact of the intervention or reorganiza­
tion on per capita expenditures. It corresponds to Xg in 
the regression equation. The third independent variable 
"intervention slope" is a measure of the long-term impact on 
state executive branch reorganization on per capita expendi­
tures. This variable corresponds to X^ in the regression 
equation.
The tables contain the unstandardized regression 
coefficients and the standardized regression coefficients 
known as beta weights. Both coefficients are displayed since 
the three independent variables use different units of 
measure. Consequently, it is not possible to arrive at a 
comparison of the relative strength of the independent variables 
by examining the unstandardized regression coefficient.
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This problem can be overcome by relying on the standardized 
regression coefficient. The standardization process allows 
the beta weights to be interpreted as though each independent 
variable reflected the same unit of measurement.
This research effort is concerned with an evalua­
tion of the short- and long-term effects of reorganization.
As such, the focus of the analysis becomes the regression 
coefficients associated with the "intervention intercept" 
and the "intervention slope." These regression coefficients 
indicate the extent to which expenditures differ significantly 
from the level projected from the amount of previous spending. 
Interpretation of these coefficients requires elaboration. 
Using the per capita expenditures for education in Georgia,
for example, the correct interpretation of the various
2regression coefficients can be illustrated. The interrupted 
time-series regression is represented by the equation:
Y = a + b^X^ + bgXg + bgXg + e.
The predicted per capita education expenditure for Georgia 
can be found by simply substituting the appropriate values 
for any given year. In this case the estimate for 1979 
per capita education expenditures can be predicted as follows: 
a = 121.00 (the constant)
^1 = 12.14 ^1 = 12
^2 = -7.92 ^2 = 1
^3 = 10.97 ^3 = 6
Y = 121.00 + 12.14 (12) + (-7.92) (1) + 10.97 (6) 
= $324.58
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The actual per capita education expenditure for Georgia in 
1979 was $333.00. The estimate is thus fairly accurate.
The regression coefficients in table 4-2 indicate 
that the per capita expenditure for education in Georgia has 
been increasing at a rate of $12.14 per year as reflected by 
the coefficient b^. The coefficient b^ indicates that the 
reorganization of the state executive branch had the short­
term impact of reducing the increase in total per capita edu­
cation expenditures by $7.92. This should not be inter­
preted as evidence that the reorganization reduced per capita 
expenditures by $7.92 since this expenditure was increasing 
at an annual rate of $12.14. It does mean that in the short­
term the expenditures increased only by $4.22 ($12.14 - 
$7.92). The long-term impact of the reorgnanization was an 
annual increase in per capita education expenditure for the 
five year period of $10.97 as reflected by bg. After 
reorganization per capita education expenditures grew as a 
rate of $23.11 ($12.14 + $10.97). The rate of growth appears 
to accelerate after reorganization. The implication of 
this finding will be discussed later.
Given the increasing demands for government service, 
the average annual change in per capita expenditures should 
always reflect an increase rather than a decrease in expendi­
tures. An increase in expenditures is reflected by a positive 
regression coefficient associated with b^, the "time" variable. 
An examination of tables 4-2 and 4-3 reveals that all of these 
coefficients are in fact positive.
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If the reorganization results in a short-term 
reduction in the rate of increase in expenditures, the sign 
associated with the intervention intercept (bg) should be 
negative. If the reorganization results in a long-term 
reduction in the rate of increase in expenditures the sign 
associated with the intervention slope (b^) should also be 
negative.
This investigation is concerned with accepting or 
rejecting the following null hypotheses:
Hg-I: State executive branch reorganization
produces no short-term effect on 
expenditure policy.
H^-II: State executive branch reorganization
produces no long-term effect on 
expenditure policy.
These hypotheses can be accepted or rejected by determining 
whether or not the parameters b^ and b^ for reorganized states 
have a difference from zero that is statistically significant. 
This judgment can be made by examining the F-ratio for each 
regression coefficient. If the regression coefficients b^ 
and bg are not statistically significant, the null hypotheses 
would be accepted with the conclusion that the intervention 
of state executive branch reorganization produced no effect 
on public policy.
If these parameters are statistically significant 
the first step is taken toward rejecting the null hypotheses.
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The second step requires that the problem of autocorrelation 
be eliminated before the null hypothesis can be rejected in 
complete confidence. The existence of autocorrelation can 
be tested with the statistic Pack's Q. If autocorrelation 
is not a problem, then the null hypotheses can be safely 
rejected and attention focused on developing a theoretically 
sound interpretation.
An examination of tables 4-2 and 4-3 indicates 
that the Q statistic is not significant for any of the equa­
tions in which either b^ or bg are statistically significant. 
Autocorrelation is therefore not a problem that must be 
addressed in this research effort. The analysis may continue.
If state executive branch reorganization does in 
fact produce the results claimed by its advocates, the infor­
mation reflected in table 4-2 and 4-3 should be along pre­
dictable lines. First, for the reorganized states, the 
regression coefficients for the short-term and long-term 
effects should be negative and statistically significant.
If the signs are not negative then the reorganization of the 
state executive branch would not produce the claimed effect 
of reducing the rate of increase in expenditures. Second, 
if the reorganization is to produce a measurable impact, 
these regression coefficients must be statistically significant.
It is important to note that virtually all of the 
gubernatorial messages call for a reduction in state spending. 
The link between executive branch reorganization and a reduction
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in expenditures was stated specifically in several of the 
messages and implied in others. The governors typically called 
for stretching tax dollars to provide the requisite level of 
public services with executive branch reorganization serving 
as the tool for reducing the rate of growth in spending.
While Meier's (1980) investigation concluded that reorganiza­
tion had no impact on total state expenditures, this research 
effort focuses on policy areas of special interest to governors. 
Since the governors are generally committed to a reduction in 
spending, the signs of the regression coefficients are hypothe­
sized to be negative if reorganization produces the limited 
results.
While some critics might well argue that expenditures 
for the policy areas selected would actually rise because of 
the increased level of gubernatorial concern such is not neces­
sarily the case. When the innaugural messages and state of 
the state addresses are examined, an additional theme is un­
covered. That theme is one of transferring responsibility for 
public services to local government whenever possible. If 
executive branch reorganization results in an increase in the 
power of the governor, the transfer of some responsibility from 
the state to local government might be achieved. The result 
of such a transfer would allow a further reduction in state 
expenditures to be achieved. Thus, the pattern could emerge in 
which a reduction is achieved in the rate of increase in state 
spending coupled with a growing rate of spending in these 
policy areas at the local level.
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In the case of the unreorganized states, no particular 
pattern of either positive or negative coefficients should 
appear. The presence of statistically significant negative 
coefficients for these states would threaten the conclusion 
that reorganization had an impact on policy. History would 
have to be considered as a potential factor.
As an aid to clarity, the data in tables 4-2 and 4-3 
have been reduced, restructured, and displayed in tables 4-4 
and through 4-10. These tables reflect the direction of the 
regression coefficients for the short- and long-term impact 
of reorganization by policy area for the reorganized state and 
its matched-pair state. Statistical significance at the .01 
level is indicated by an asterisk. Each of these policy areas 
will be examined on an individual basis.
Agriculture Policy
According to the data in table 4-4 the reorganization 
of the South Dakota executive branch of government did not pro­
duce either a short- or long-term reduction in the rate of in­
crease in per capita agriculture expenditures. The regression 
coefficients for South Dakota are both positive. Since neither 
coefficient is statistically significant at the .01 level, the 
null hypotheses would not be rejected, and the conclusion is 
reached that reorganization did not produce an effect on expend­
itures. The fact that the direction of the signs is positive 
for both South Dakota and North Dakota is additional evidence 
that the intervention did not produce the predicted result.
T a b le  4 -4
Comparison of Regression Coefficient Signs of 
Reorganized States and Matched Pair States 
for Agricultural Expenditures
Reorganized State/Matched State
Short Term Impact 
State^ Control^)
Long Term Impact 
State^ Control^
South Dakota/North Dakota + + + +*
^Reorganized State 
^Matched State
*Significant at .01 level
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In order for the reorganization to have had an impact the 
regression coefficients for South Dakota would have been nega­
tive and statistically significant. The conclusion is reached 
that reorganization did not have an impact on agricultural policy.
Education Policy
Table 4-5 contains the results of the time-series 
regression analysis for the nine reorganized states in which 
education policy was an issue of concern to the governor in 
office at the time of reorganization. Six of the reorganized 
states— California, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, and 
Wisconsin— do have negative regression coefficients associated 
with short-term impact. This compares with five nonreorgan­
ized states which also have a negative short-term regression 
coefficient. It is essential to note that none of the negative 
coefficients for the reorganized states are statistically 
significant. However, the negative regression coefficient 
for Kansas, an unreorganized state, is statistically signifi­
cant. Given this array, the null hypothesis for short-term 
impact would be accepted for the reorganized states due to 
the lack of statistical significance of the negative signs.
The null hypothesis would be rejected for two non­
reorganized states: Kansas and Pennsylvania. The short-term
effect in Kansas was negative and statistically significant 
while the short-term effect in Maryland was positive and 
statistically significant. For the year following reorgani­
zation in Colorado, the matched-pair state Kansas experienced
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Table 4-5
Comparison of Regression Coefficient Signs of 





Short Term Impact 
State^ Control^
Direction of 
Long Term Impact 
State& Control^
California/New York - + +* +
Colorado/Kansas - _* +* +*
Georgia/Alabama - - +* +*
Kentucky/Tennessee - + +* +
Maine/New Hampshire - - + -
Maryland/Pennsylvania + + -
Missouri/Oklahoma + - - +
Virginia/South Carolina + + + +
Wisconsin/Minnesota - - +* +*
^Reorganized State 
^Matched State 
♦significant at .01 level
120
a significant drop in the rate of increase in per capita 
education expenditures. Pennsylvania, Maryland's matched 
pair state, reflected a statistically significant short­
term increase in the rate of per capita education expendi­
tures. Since neither of these states reorganized, the 
change can be attributed to the occurence of other events 
or history.
When the long-term impact is examined, only one 
reorganized state, Missouri, has a negative regression 
coefficient, and it was not statistically significant. Two 
nonreorganized states. New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, have 
negative coefficients, but neither of these is statistically 
significant.
A somewhat puzzling finding is that five of the 
reorganized states, California, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, 
and Wisconsin, have statistically significant positive 
regression signs. On the surface this might be an indication 
that the reorganization resulted in an increase in the long­
term rate of expenditure. Such a finding is of no help. 
However, three of the matched-pair states also experienced 
a statistically significant increase in the long-term rate 
of expenditure for education. Again, this increase in expen­
ditures can be attributed to the occurence of other events 
or history.
Analysis of table 4-5 does not lend support to the 
thesis that reorganization has an impact on education policy.
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The significant short- and long-term effects observed were 
in the wrong direction and attributable to history.
Health Policy
The results of the analysis for health policy are 
presented in table 4-6. All three reorganized states have 
negative regression coefficients for the short-term impact 
of reorganization. This is in the hypothesized direction.
The short-term signs for the nonreorganized states are all 
positives. This is also in the hypothesized direction. But 
it is still not possible to reject the null hypothesis. None 
of the negative coefficients for the reorganized states are 
significant, and only one of the positive coefficients for 
the nonreorganized states is significant. The result is that 
the null hypothesis of no effect must be accepted for the 
short-term impact of reorganization.
When the long-term impact is examined, the con­
clusion is the same. All three reorganized states have sta­
tistically significant positive regression coefficients.
This should not be interpreted as an indication that reorgani­
zation resulted in an increase in the rate of expenditure 
for health. The fact that two of the matched-pair states 
also have positive regression coefficients in an indication 
that other forces or developments apparently fostered the 
increase in the long-term rate of expenditure. The long-term 
negative coefficient for the nonreorganized state of Tennessee
T a b le  4 -6
Comparison of Regression Coefficient Signs of 








*significant at .01 level
Direction of 
Long Term Impact 
Stated Control^
Kentucky/Tennessee - +* +* --
Maryland/Pennsylvania - + +* +*
Massachusetts/New Jersey - + +* +*
toK>
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can be dismissed with minimal concern due to its lack of 
statistical significance.
Again, the analysis does not support the thesis 
that reorganization has an impact on policy. No significant 
difference was observed between the reorganized states 
and their matched-pair states for health policy.
Highway Policy
The findings of the time-series analysis for 
highway policy are presented in table 4-7. Only one reorgan­
ized state, Wisconsin, has a negative regression coefficient. 
While it is in the hypothesized direction, it is not sta­
tistically significant. Three of the nonreorganized states. 
New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Minnesota, also have negative 
short-term coefficients. None are statistically significant. 
The result is that the null hypothesis of no effect is 
accepted for the short-term impact of reorganization.
When the coefficients for long-term impact are 
examined, two reorganized states, Maine and Missouri, are 
found to have negative coefficients. This is contrasted 
with the fact that four of the five nonreorganized states 
have negative long-term coefficients. However, none of the 
negative coefficients for both groups were statistically 
significant. Only one long-term coefficient was statistically 
significant. This is a positive coefficient for Massachusetts, 
a reorganized state. This is in the wrong direction and 
does not help.
T a b le  4 -7
Comparison of Regression Coefficient Signs of 




Short Term Impact 
State& Control^
Direction of 
Long Term Impact 
State& Control^
Maine/New Hampshire + + +
Massachusetts/New Jersey + - +*
Missouri/Oklahoma + - — —
Virginia/South Carolina + + +




*significant at .01 level
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The conclusion based on the data in table 4-7 
does not allow a rejection of the null hypotheses that 
reorganization has no effect on policy. Again, no sig­
nificant difference was observed between the reorganized 
and control states for highway policy. A relationship 
between state executive branch reorganization and expendi­
ture policy was not discovered.
Natural Resource Policy 
Table 4-8 presents the results of the time-series 
regression for natural resource expenditure policy. Three 
of the reorganized states, California, Colorado, and Missouri, 
have negative regression coefficients. However, none of 
these are statistically significant. Two of the unreorgan­
ized states, Kansas (the matched-pair for Colorado) and 
Minnesota, also have negative regression coefficients. Again, 
they are not statistically significant. The only statistically 
significant short-term regression coefficient is that for 
Tennessee, and it is positive.
The short-term regression coefficients do not 
allow a rejection of the null hypothesis that reorganization 
has no effect on policy. The absence of statistically sig­
nificant negative coefficients indicates that no relation­
ship was found.
When the long-term coefficients are examined, eight 
of the reorganized states are found to have negative signs.
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T ab le  4 -8
Comparison of Regression Coefficient Signs of 
Reorganized States and Matched Pair States 




Short Term Impact 
State& Control^
Direction of 
Long Term Impact 
State& Control^
California/New York - + _*
Colorado/Kansas - - + +*
Georgia/Alabama + + _*
Idaho-Wyoming + + - —
Kentucky/Tennessee + +* *" -
Maine/New Hampshire + + + —
Massachusetts/New Jersey + + +
Mis souri/Oklahoma - + + —*
South Dakota/North 
Dakota + + + *
Virginia/South 
Carolina + + — —





at . 01 level
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However, only two states, California and Georgia, have 
negative coefficients that are statistically significant.
The signs for their matched-pair states. New York and Ala­
bama, are also negative but are not statistically significant. 
This would indicate that for California and Georgia a long­
term reduction in the rate of increase of per capita natural 
resource expenditures followed executive branch reorgani­
zation. This conclusion is somewhat tempered by the fact 
that Oklahoma, a nonreorganized state, also has a statistically 
significant negative coefficient. Since Oklahoma was matched 
with Missouri and not California or Georgia, it can be dis­
counted.
The array for the long-term impact suggests that 
the null hypothesis of no effect can be rejected for only 
two reorganized states, California and Georgia. In the 
remaining nine states the hypothesis cannot be rejected.
On the basis of this evidence one would be hard pressed to 
conclude that executive branch reorganization has a long-term 
impact on policy.
While no short-term impact on natural resource 
policy was observed, a long-term impact was observed for two 
reorganized states. Even though the relationship is 
definite for California and Georgia, it is not possible 
to conclude that state executive branch reorganization has 
a general impact on natural resource policy due to the absence 
of the relationship for the other reorganized states.
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Police
The results of the time-series regression for 
police expenditures are presented in table 4-9. Five of 
the eight reorganized states have negative regression co­
efficients associated with the short-term impact of reorg­
anization while this is the case for only two nonreorganized 
states. However, it is still not possible to reject the 
null hypothesis of no effect since none of these negative 
coefficients are statistically significant. There is no 
evidence that state executive reorganization is linked to 
police expenditures.
When the long-term effects are examined, only one 
reorganized state, Maine, has a negative coefficient while 
three nonreorganized states. New Hampshire (Maine's matched- 
pair), Kansas, and Oklahoma also have negative coefficients. 
None of these negative coefficients are statistically sig­
nificant. Two of the long-term positive coefficients for 
the reorganized states are statistically significant (Colorado 
and Kentucky) while none of the positive coefficients for 
the nonreorganized states are statistically significant.
Before reaching the conclusion that reorganization resulted 
in an increase in expenditures, developments within the two 
states would have to be carefully examined.
The data analysis, therefore, indicates that a 
link between executive branch reorganization and law enforce­




Comparison of Regression Coefficient Signs of 








State^ Control” State^ Control^
California/New York - + + +
Colorado/Kansas - + +* -
Georgia/Alabama + + + +
Kentucky/Tennessee - - +* *
Maine/New Hampshire + + - -
Maryland/Pennsylvania - + + +
Massachusetts/New
Jersey + + + +
Mis souri/Oklahoma - - + -
Reorganized State 
^Matched State 
*significant at .01 level
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Welfare Policy 
The relationship between state executive branch - 
reorganization and welfare policy is presented in table 4-10.
Two of the reorganized states have negative regression co­
efficients while three of the nonreorganized match-paired 
states have negative coefficients. Again, it is not possible 
to reject the null of hypotheses of no effect because none 
of the negative coefficients are statistically significant.
The coefficients for long-term effect present the 
same results. The reorganized states all have positive long­
term regression coefficients with three being statistically 
significant. The three control states matched with these 
states also have statistically significant positive coefficients, 
Again, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that reorganization has an impact on policy. Only 
one state, the nonreorganized state of New Jersey, has a 
negative coefficient. However, it was not statistically 
significant.
The results of the time-series regression prevents 
arriving at the conclusion that state executive branch reorg­
anization has an impact on welfare expenditures.
Summary of Findings 
The absence of a link between state executive 
branch reorganization and expenditure policies is illustrated 
in the summary table 4-11. While differences do exist
T a b le  4 -1 0
Comparison of Regression Coefficient Signs of 




Short Terra Impact 
State& Control^
Direction of 
Long Terra Impact 
States Control^
California/New York + + +* 4-*
Maryland/Pennsylvania + - +* +*
Massachusetts/New Jersey + + +
Missouri/Oklahoma - - + +
Wisconsin/Minnesota - - +* +*
Reorganized State 
^Matched State 
♦significant at .01 level
w
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T ab le  4 -1 1
Direction of Short-Term and Long-Term Changes in Per 
Capita Expenditures in Reorganized and Nonreorganized 
States by Policy Area (Number of Changes Statistically 









Reorganized States 1 0 1 0
Nonreorganized States 1 0 1 (1) 0
Education
Reorganized States 3 6 8 (5) 1
Nonreorganized States 4 (1) 5 (1) 7 (3) 2
Health
Reorganized States 0 3 3 (3) 0
Nonreorganized States 3 (1) 0 2 (2) 1
Highways
Reorganized States 4 1 3 (1) 2
Nonreorganized States 2 3 1 4
Natural Resources
Reorganized States 8 3 3 8 (2)
Nonreorganized States 9 (1) 2 4 (2) 7 (1)
Police
Reorganized States 3 5 7 (2) 1
Nonreorganized States 6 2 5 2
Welfare
Reorganized States 3 2 5 (3) 0
Nonreorganized States 2 3 4 (3) 1
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between reorganized and nonreorganized states, an absence 
of statistical significance makes these differences unim­
portant. The only reorganized states with a statistically 
significant decrease in the rate of increase in per capita 
spending which was not shared by their matched-pair state 
were California and Georgia in natural resource policy.
On this basis it is not possible to arrive at the conclusion 
that state executive branch reorganization has the pre­
dicted effect on public policy.
Tables 4-12 and 4-13 also serve to illustrate 
this same finding. In table 4-12 the short-term and long­
term effects are summarized without regard for statistical 
significance. For the forty-two regression equations incor­
porated in the analysis, a short-term decrease in the rate 
of increase in expenditures was noted in twenty equations 
for the reorganized states and in fifteen of the nonreorg­
anized states. The difference in this distribution is not 
statistically significant.
The same holds true for the long-term effects.
For the forty-two regression equations, a long-term decrease 
in the rate of increase in expenditures was noted in twelve 
equations for the reorganized states and in eighteen equa­
tions for the nonreorganized states. Again the difference 
in this distribution is not statistically significant.
The absence of a relationship between state execu­
tive branch reorganization and expenditure policy is even
134
T ab le  4 -12
Direction of Short-Term and Long-Term 
Changes in Per Capita Expenditures in 













X^ = 1.86 
p > .30
Table 4-13
Direction of Short-Term and Long-Term Changes in Per 
Capita Expenditures in Reorganized and Nonreorganized 
States for which Coefficients Are Statistically 














more forcefully illustrated in table 4-13. Only those 
equations with statistically significant coefficients are 
included. No equation for the reorganized states pro­
duced a statistically significant short-term decrease in 
the rate of increase in per capita expenditures. Only two 
equations for the reorganized states produced a statistically 
significant long-term decrease in the rate of increase in 
per capita expenditures while one equation for the nonre­
organized states resulted in a statistically significant 
negative coefficient.
Analysis of the time-series regression equations 
failed to establish a link between state executive branch 
reorganization and expenditure policy. The data did not 
support the position of many advocates of reorganization 
that structural change in the executive branch of government 
would result in a reduction in the rate of increase in 
expenditures across a wide range of policy areas. This 
analysis failed to find evidence that state executive branch 
reorganization produces the results claimed by its advocates.
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Notes
^Analysis did not include interrupted time-series 
regression for all twelve reorganized states and their 
matched-pair states in all seven policy areas. The theo­
retical justification for this selection process is dis­
cussed in chapter III.
2Georgia was selected as an example because the 
governor initiating reorganization is now President Carter. 
Any state or policy area would be equally appropriate for 
selection as an example.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Executive branch reorganization has been advocated 
as an appropriate remedy for many of the problems facing 
state government today. Some have argued that enacting an 
extensive program of structural change will eliminate poor 
organization and create a "good" organizational structure 
which is more conducive for positive results in the opera­
tion of government (Weinberger, 1978).
An extensive body of literature exists which examines 
the processes, perceived benefits, and strategies for achieving 
executive branch reorganization. The major shortcoming of 
this large body of literature is the absence of any substan­
tial empirical evidence that the implementation of any reorgan­
ization plan will result in any impact on public policy or gov­
ernment operations. The absence of such research has made 
the rejection of pro-reorganization arguments difficult. The 
arguments and assumptions forwarded by the proponents of re­
organization were largely unchallenged. Research efforts 
directed specifically at evaluating reorganization efforts
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tended to be case studies which were narrow in scope and 
which focused primarily on the strategies involved and the 
structural changes which were produced (for example see 
Mosher, 1967) .
A gap thus existed in the literature which prevented 
an appraisal of the impact of reorganization on the policies 
pursued by government. This research effort was directed 
toward filling that gap by examining the impact of state 
executive branch reorganization on a variety of public poli­
cies over time.
Summary of the Study 
The extent and nature of government reorganization 
was examined in chapter I. The rationale for reorganizing 
government was consistent for virtually all advocates. Reorgan­
ization would produce significant benefits. The cost of gov­
ernment would be reduced, the cost of implementing and operat­
ing programs would be reduced, the rate of growth in the number 
of state employees would also be reduced, and general operat­
ing efficiency would be increased (see Buck, 1950; Eley, 1967; 
Fain, 1979; and Garnett and Levine, 1978) .
Government reorganization is not an issue new to 
the United States. It was traced back to the turn of the cen­
tury. Concern with structural reform has not been limited to 
the state level, either. Extensive reorganization activity 
has taken place at both the federal and local levels. In 
fact, significant evidence exists that activity at one level
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tends to encourage reorganization activity at other levels.
The fact that the federal Hoover Commissions encouraged the 
formation of "little Hoover Commissions" in a number of states 
supports this interpretation.
In short, government reorganization was found to be 
an issue of continuing concern at both the federal and state 
level. Consequently, efforts to reorganize government should 
be an important issue at both the state and federal level for 
the forseeable future. Government reorganization should there­
fore continue to be a major topic in the study of public 
administration.
In chapter II the general theoretical framework for 
the study was presented. The literature contains numerous 
studies examining the link between the structure of government 
and public policy. The majority of the previous efforts have 
focused on the relationship between the structure of urban 
government and public policy and the relationship between state 
legislative reform and public policy. In these studies public 
policy was frequently measured with expenditure data. The use 
of per capita expenditures as an appropriate measure of public 
policy in this study was justified essentially on the basis of 
its wide-spread acceptance in the public policy literature.
One potential shortcoming of much previous public 
policy research is its cross-sectional nature. Very little 
research of a longitudinal nature has been conducted. This 
research effort has overcome this problem by employing a 
quasi-experimental time-series research design.
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The specific research methodology was discussed in 
chapter III. The interrupted time-series analysis allows 
both the short-term and long-term effects of state executive 
branch reorganization to be determined. The statistical 
techniques used and the correct interpretation of the time- 
series regression coefficients were covered.
The findings of the research were presented in 
detail in chapter IV. For the seven policy areas selected 
for analysis and the twelve reorganized states included in 
the study, no link was established between structural reorgan­
ization and public policy. In several cases the hypothesized 
negative regression coefficients were found, but their lack 
of statistical significance forced acceptance of the null 
hypotheses regarding a relationship between executive branch 
reorganization and expenditure policy.
State Executive Branch Reorganization 
and Public Policy
This research has examined the relationship between . 
executive reorganization and seven major state expenditure 
areas. The findings have failed to support the widely accepted 
tenet that government reorganization will have an impact on 
policy by reducing the rate of increase in expenditures. Of 
the twelve reorganized states included in the study, the only 
statistically significant reduction in the rate of increase 
in spending was for the states of California and Georgia for 
natural resources. A genuine lack of empirical evidence was
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found which would support executive branch reorganization as 
a technique for reducing expenditures and influencing policy. 
The results of this investigation fail to support the argu­
ments of reform groups and elected public officials that 
reorganization will have a significant impact on government 
spending policy.
When the findings of this effort are combined with 
those of Meier (1980), the impact of executive reorganization 
on government appears to be minimal. Meier investigated the 
effect of state executive branch reorganization on state 
employment and total expenditures using techniques identical 
with those used here. His findings were consistent with 
those presented in chapter IV. He concluded that neither the 
rate of increase in state employment nor the rate of increase 
in total state expenditures were affected by reorganization.
The results of this research are consistent with 
those of earlier investigations which focused on the rela­
tionship between public policy and the structure of urban 
government. That literature failed to find much evidence 
that governmental reform at the local level would produce a 
change in the policy choices of those governments.
At the state level, previous research has indicated 
that the policy choices of government appear to be affected 
more by the socioeconomic background of the state than by 
political forces. The findings of this research do not chal­
lenge the earlier findings. The fact that public policy does
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not respond to changes in the political environment as 
traditionally operationalized is disturbing in that it 
contradicts traditional democratic theory that political 
factors should make a very real difference in public policy 
choices.̂
The fact that this research failed to demonstrate 
a link between state executive branch reorganization and 
public policy seems to support the body of literature claim­
ing no effect on policy would be produced (see Downs, 1967; 
Rourke, 1976; Malek, 1978). At the same time it would be a 
mistake to write government reorganization off as an exercise 
in futility. Analysis utilizing different tests of state 
reorganization than those employed in this investigation 
might produce results supportive of reorganization efforts.
Emmerich (1950: 8) identified two tests for eval­
uating the effectiveness of any reorganization effort. These 
were:
1. Is administration made more responsive to the 
general interest of the public?
2. Is the ability of the chief executive to 
insure that the laws are faithfully executed 
strengthened?
These tests do not include an examination of expenditure 
patterns. They focus on the issues of responsibility, 
accountability, and gubernatorial power. These are different 
questions than those addressed in this research effort. 
Operationalizing the above tests are a suitable araa for 
additional research in evaluating state executive branch 
reorganization.
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It is also important to note that the findings 
presented do not address the effect of reorganization on 
either questions of efficiency, employment patterns, or 
public policy choices at the federal level. More research 
is needed to evaluate the impact of reorganization at the 
federal level. The methodology employed in this study, 
interrupted time-teries analysis, would be most appropriate 
fur such an investigation.
This research effort also demonstrated the feasi­
bility and utility of employing interrupted time-series analy­
sis in public policy research. The technique can be opera­
tionalized with little difficulty and has significant 
advantages over the cross-sectional studies employed in the 
past.
In conclusion, this research and the other limited 
research in the area suggests that reorganizing the state 
executive branch of government has no demonstrable impact on 
policy priorities or employment patterns at the state level.
At the same time, the results fail to prove that the reorgani­
zation of state government serves no useful purpose. It is 
possible that the "streamlining" of state government may be 
a technique for strengthening gubernatorial control over the 
executive bureaucracy. The result would be an increased level 
of accountability within the bureaucracy to the majority will 
of the public as expressed in the electoral process. Reorgani­
zation also might have the effect of increasing the ability of
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the public to determine the agency or department responsible 
for specific government programs or policies. These questions 




^Dye and Gray (1980) noted that political scientists 
often approach the study of public policy with certain biases. 
These include the conviction that the characteristics of the 
political system do have an impact on policy choices and 
that party competition, public participation, and equality in 
representation will result in the adoption of "good" public 
policies. They argue that these assumptions are best treated 
as hypotheses to be tested rather than as "a priori" tenets.
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